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using methods "reminiscent of Hitler's hangmen," while the French delegate was moved to propose that the United Nations should increase the size of its observer team and expand its function.

It is my understanding that the American delegates to the United Nations were extremely indignant over the one-sided report sent back to the United Nations by its observer team.

In the light of the facts I have here detailed, I am more than ever convinced that United Nations intervention in the Dominican Republic has already done grave harm and that its continued presence there is bound to have a further unsettling effect.

I hope that our delegates to the United Nations will do everything in their power to resist any expansion of authority and numbers on the part of the United Nations team.

THE WAY OUT

I would be willing to go along with the most generous measures to help bail the United Nations out of its financial crisis.

But I consider it necessary to state for the record that I am becoming increasingly fed up with the double standard of behavior that leads the United Nations to intervene in situations where effective peacekeeping machinery already exists and where its own presence can do nothing but harm, while it fails to intervene or even to take notice of clear-cut cases of military aggression involving the nations of either the Communist bloc or the Afro-Asian bloc.

I am certain that this concern is shared by the overwhelming majority of the American people.

This is the real crisis of the United Nations, and not the financial crisis.

If the United Nations is again to become an instrument of law and a force for peace, many things must be done.

In addition to creating some kind of mechanism that can protect and improve the United Nations by submitting its operations to periodic scrutiny, it is essential that we ourselves and the member nations who share our values face up to the disastrous erosion of the United Nations Charter in recent years and embark on a campaign for a return to the Charter.

If the Charter calls for "respect for the obligations arising from treaties," the unilateral repudiation of any treaty by a member nation should at the very least call for the unanimous censure of the General Assembly.

If the Charter calls for the "self-determination of peoples," the United Nations should use its moral authority impartially to promote self-determination for the captive peoples of Europe as well as for those Asian and African peoples still living under colonial rule.

If the Charter calls upon all members to "refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force," this must not be construed as applying only to the Western nations and not to the nations of the Communist bloc or Afro-Asian bloc.

It must not be construed as meaning that India is free to invade Goa, that the United Arab Republic is free to invade Yemen, that the Brazzaville Congo

and Tanganyika, and Tunisia, and Algeria are free to organize and harbor guerrilla armies for operations elsewhere in Africa.

If the United Nations General Assembly is no longer prepared to condemn such blatant use of force or such outspoken threats of force as Khrushchev's Berlin ultimatum, then I say that the United Nations has lost a large part of the justification for its existence.

If the Charter prohibits intervention in domestic matters, the General Assembly must abide by this clause, too.

I believe that we must make every effort to save the United Nations as an area of contact between the Communist world, the free world, and the uncommitted nations; as a forum from which we can plead the cause of freedom and solicit the support of the world community for the objectives of our foreign policy; as a medium for the conciliation of disputes; as a vehicle for cooperative nonpolitical activities like the World Health Organization; as an organization whose functions may be progressively enlarged if the world situation improves.

The United Nations can be saved, and should be saved.

The United Nations will not be saved if we continue to ascribe to it virtues which it cannot possibly possess and assign to it executive tasks that it is functionally incapable of fulfilling.

It will not be saved if we continue to sweep its misdemeanors and weaknesses under the rug instead of airing them frankly.

But above all, the United Nations will not be saved unless we are prepared to provide the leadership for an all-out campaign to return to the principles enunciated in the United Nations Charter, and to give these principles the force of law in the relations between nations.

This, as I see it, is the prime task that confronts us.

Mr. LONG of Louisiana. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. DODD. I yield.

Mr. LONG of Louisiana. It was my honor to represent the United States as a delegate to the United Nations in this session. I cannot disagree with what the Senator is saying today. Frankly—I say this as a Senator; I have no privilege to say it as a member of the U.S. delegation—there is a serious doubt in my own mind that the United Nations can succeed in its purposes as a peacekeeping organization so long as it has so many elements in it that are really there for the purpose of keeping it from working.

One can say anything he wishes, the fact remains that the Communist nations do not serve the purpose of the United Nations. The U.N. was formed as a group of nations joining to work together for peace, to preserve the peace of the world, and provide peaceful means of solving international crises.

There is a growing doubt in this Senator's mind as to whether the organization can be as effective a peacekeeping organization of free people as it would be if it were limited to nations that shared similar purposes.

I do not say we should abolish the United Nations, but I doubt whether we

should entrust to the United Nations such peacekeeping functions as have been delegated to it.

It seems to me that if we had to keep the peace an organization of nations that really intended to do just that, and let the United Nations be the debating society which it has always tended to be, we might more effectively achieve our purposes.

The Organization of American States is an organization of states with similar goals and philosophies. There are not the same problems in that organization as there are in the United Nations. The OAS wishes to keep the peace, to see that each neighbor lives within its own boundaries. It wants no aggression, and will brook no aggression. We can in good conscience have the OAS send a commander to command our forces in the Dominican Republic, knowing that the organization has the same purpose that we have. We want to have peace. We do not want to have overthrown any peaceful government, particularly a government that follows the will of its people.

The Senator has made a good argument, namely that the United Nations will have to do a better job of accomplishing the purposes of the charter, or we shall have to find something to take its place in carrying out its functions, and let the organization exist as a debating society, where we can bring together all those who do not agree, and let them debate and debate, without conclusion. Its place may have to be taken by an organization that can settle disputes among nations, an organization that can arrive at a consensus and then get nations to agree to that decision. I regret to say that the United Nations has at times proved disappointing.

Mr. DODD. I am grateful for the Senator's comments. I am sure that he and I and the vast majority of the people want the United Nations to succeed.

Our point is that the way to bring that about is to have it operate as it was intended to operate, by not going beyond its charter, and by not failing to live up to the requirements of its charter. For example, the U.N. should have acted in the case of Yemen. When Nasser invaded Yemen with 50,000 troops, the United Nations did not show any interest. Goa is another case.

In addition, the U.N. must learn that it has no right to go into a sovereign country and interfere in matters which must be settled domestically. That is the lesson of the Congo.

I am grateful to the Senator from Louisiana for his contribution.

FE *[Signature]* Dadd
BARBARISM IN VIETNAM

Mr. DODD. Mr. President, in a concise, pointed editorial on Monday, June 28, the Hartford Times commented on the execution last week of Sgt. Harold Bennett.

The editorial concluded with these words:

The execution of Sergeant Bennett . . . was illegal, an act of murder. The U.S. Government should promptly and publicly serve notice that every person who had a hand in

It will be considered a criminal, and so treated, and the word and power of the United States should be pledged to that end.

I agree fully, and ask unanimous consent that this editorial be printed in the Record at this point.

There being no objection, the editorial was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

BARBARISM IN VIETNAM

The Hanoi government of North Vietnam says Sgt. Harold George Bennett, U.S. Army, was executed as "an aggressor who had committed many crimes against the South Vietnamese people."

Just for the record.

Sergeant Bennett, like all other American soldiers in Vietnam, was there at the invitation of the legal government of that country. He was a uniformed member of a regular military force, acting under the lawful orders of his superiors. By international law and age-old custom, he was entitled to humane treatment from his captors.

His execution was in reprisal against the executions of several Vietcong members by the South Vietnamese Government.

The Vietcong is considered by the Government of South Vietnam to be an illegal organization. Its members are legally traitors. The Government of the United States, the U.S. Army, and Sergeant Bennett had no part in the treatment of Vietcong members by the Government of South Vietnam.

The execution of Sergeant Bennett, therefore, was illegal, an act of murder. The U.S. Government should promptly and publicly serve notice that every person who had a hand in it will be considered a criminal and so treated, and the word and power of the United States should be pledged to that end.

NEW HAVEN RAILROAD

Mr. DODD. Mr. President, I commend to the attention of my colleagues, especially the Senators from the lower New England-New York area, an excellent series of three articles that appeared in the Hartford Times last week.

These articles are important and informative not only because they cover the background and recent developments concerning the New Haven Railroad but because the articles go into the possibility of private enterprise stepping in and bringing services back to a high level.

What good private management can do to straighten out a failing railroad is too often left out of discussions and proposals on how to keep the New Haven from going under.

Railroads in worse trouble than the New Haven have been not only saved but turned into profitable ventures by private means.

Why not the New Haven?

I ask unanimous consent to have these Hartford Times articles, written by Don O. Noel, Jr., printed in the Record at this point.

There being no objection, the articles were ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

EXPERTS DISAGREE ON NEW HAVEN RAILROAD SURVIVAL

(Who will buy the New Haven Railroad? Until recently, there have appeared only two choices. The merging Penn-Central Railroad, or else the States themselves. There now appears a third choice: New England private enterprise. In this series, the Hartford Times explores the facts and figures which lead a growing number of businessmen to believe the bankrupt New Haven could make money.)

(By Don O. Noel, Jr.)

Can the New Haven Railroad's commuter operations turn a profit?

"No," says Stuart T. Saunders, chairman of the Pennsylvania Railroad, one of the merging Penn-Central leaders now negotiating to run that very commuter service on a contract basis.

Mr. Saunders told his stockholders in May that "there is no way on earth" that commuter railroads, such as the Long Island, and presumably the New Haven as well, can be made profitable.

"Yes," says a brandnew engineering study of the New Haven, made public Monday. It forecasts a profit margin of $1\frac{1}{2}$ million a year, including amortization of new equipment and stations. Still more efficiency, it said, could come with gradual installation of automatic fare collection.

This sharp difference of opinion is one of the reasons private, New England interests are weighing a bid to buy the New Haven Railroad, including its commuter service, away from the Penn-Central.

Even before the New Haven Commuter Study Group made its findings public Monday, there were strong arguments on the side of profitable commuter service.

The strongest, the CNW, or Chicago and North Western Railway.

Five years ago, the CNW began a massive development program. Faced with competition from three new expressways, the line spent \$50 million for new equipment, double-deck cars, better timetables, rebuilt stations.

Its chairman, Ben W. Heineman, told a New York meeting of security analysts this month that his commuter operation will clear \$1 million profit in 1965. It has already begun a second, 10-percent increase in commuter equipment investment, and Mr. Heineman said another go-around lies ahead, with indefinite growth.

Mr. Heineman carefully refrained from saying a dose of CNW medicine could cure New York commuter deficits.

But a comparison of the systems suggests it might.

LENGTH OF RIDE

The CNW carries about half again as many commuters as does the New Haven. They must be picked up at three times as many stations as the New Haven's riders. Their average ride is a third shorter than the New Haven average, and therefore theoretically less efficient.

(Pennsy's Saunders told his stockholders the CNW's commuter profit is largely due to the fact that its hauls are longer than most Pennsy commuter runs. But the average New Haven commuter rides 30 miles, compared to a 21-mile average on the CNW.)

Despite these apparent handicaps, the CNW operation has been turned from loss to profit. Some of the techniques:

A new fleet of double-deck cars (160 passengers, compared with 110 on the New Haven) cut car maintenance and reduced crew size.

The CNW thus delivers to the city on each rush-hour train the same number of riders as a New Haven train, 650-700. But it uses an average of 3.8 cars instead of 6. With less train weight, less locomotive power is needed.

Greater reliance on nonstop express runs attracts passengers. It also allows less powerful (and less costly) locomotion with less frequent acceleration from stops to running speed.

The CNW uses more efficient push-pull locomotives, rather than self-propelled units. Commuter trains are backed into terminals, so two cars can be left for the evening rush, while the other one or two shuttle back and forth to give frequent midday service.

The result: It costs the CNW \$6.21 for each mile each train runs, and revenue per train-mile is \$6.40, a 19-cent profit.

It costs the New Haven \$15.30 for each train-mile, and revenues are only \$13.30, or a \$2 loss.

COST PER MILE

The CNW's operating efficiency can be viewed another way. The New Haven carries its average commuter 30 miles, one way at a cost of \$1,100 a year. The CNW carries its average rider 21 miles one way, for \$470. That's 70 percent of the distance for 43 percent of the cost.

Could the New Haven do as well?

Two separate studies, in fact, say yes. The most recent, announced this week by the New Haven Commuter Study Group, proposed spending \$15 million for 75 new self-propelled cars, and \$15 million more for new stations, maintenance yards, signaling and engineering.

The study also recommends eliminating commuter service east of Westport, and providing sharply-increased express runs.

The projected outcome: a commuter system whose trains would shave 5 to 20 minutes off present runs to Grand Central, attract new riders, and earn a profit of \$1,580,000 before taxes. Still further profit should be possible, the report said, by developing off-peak (mid-day) traffic, and by gradually automating fare collection.

Much the same result, but with slightly different techniques, was predicted in an earlier study presented the trustees in 1962. It proposed a 3-year program during which the railroad would refurbish its present cars, and gradually install double-deck, 200-passenger cars.

Included in this early study was a similar refurbishing of intercity (long-haul) service, with a bar-galley in each car served by a stewardess, more use of reserved-seat trains, and institution of unitized three-to-four car expresses, running nearly nonstop to Hartford, Providence, Boston, and a few other cities.

The estimated capital cost of such a program was \$16 million, with an \$8 million Government subsidy needed during the 3 years it would take to complete the conversion.

Trustees of the bankrupt New Haven, when presented this early refurbishing program, said they had already decided on a program to trim back the railroad, try to show a profit, and win inclusion of the slimmer, trimmer New Haven in the Penn-Central merger.

Expansion, they said, would be reversing the direction of their trusteeship.

But expansion is very much in the minds of the private business interests, now looking at the New Haven.

No one pretends a glamorized, rescheduled New Haven Railroad will begin making impressive profits right away. The CNW's \$1.3

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The editorial follows:

THIS MOTIVE IS GOOD

However history may deal with the judgment of the United States in its involvement in Vietnam and the Dominican Republic, it must accord it an unique purity of purpose. No one who has not been brainwashed can believe this Nation has any aggressive purpose.

It wants peace; it does not seek material wealth, the ancient motivations of imperialism. Whenever American policies abroad are condemned these two basic truths must be kept in mind.

This Nation twice has been drawn into world wars. In the first one, it never ventured beyond its borders in any preventive action. In the second one, it did virtually nothing to head off the escalation of the Axis' aggression until it had to go all out as a belligerent.

Virtually all of America's military actions in foreign nations bespeak an effort not to make the same mistake three times. It believes communism to be inherently aggressive. It believes aggression often takes the form of a takeover from within nations. Hence this Nation's widespread participation in efforts to stop the seedling fires. This much the whole world may say, and history cannot denounce as evil the motivation of the United States.

Who Are the Leaders of the Demonstrations?

EXTENSION OF REMARKS OF

HON. JAMES D. MARTIN

OF ALABAMA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Thursday, June 24, 1965

Mr. MARTIN of Alabama. Mr. Speaker, under permission to extend my remarks in the Record I would like to include a news story from the Gadsden (Ala.) Times of June 25, 1965. I think the good people of the North, many of whom joined in the demonstrations in Selma and the march on Montgomery, should know the caliber of some of the leaders of the so-called civil rights movement.

The article follows:

CIVIL RIGHTS LEADER JAILED, ACCUSED OF FONDLING GIRLS

SELMA, ALA.—A leader of civil rights demonstrators was in jail today, accused of fondling teenaged girls, possessing pornography and using profanity before young girls.

William Ezra Greer, 41, also was being investigated by police in connection with complaints from local civil rights leaders that Greer channeled rights movement funds into his own pocketbook.

Police Commissioner Wilson Baker said Greer, a Negro, listed addresses in Selma, Chicago, and Birmingham and had papers showing affiliation with Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., and the State youth crusade of King's Southern Christian Leadership Conference.

Greer came to Selma last March and led a 5-day prayer vigil for the Reverend James Reeb, the Boston minister killed by white men in an attack on a Selma street.

Two weeks ago, Baker said, he received statements from members of the local SCLC staff accusing Greer of taking organization funds for his own use.

"I guess we weren't investigating fast enough, because they came back and signed this series of warrants," Baker said.

At midday, Greer was freed on \$900 bond, but was arrested again after a Negro man claimed that Greer fondled his 16-year-old daughter.

An investigation of Greer's room turned up a quantity of obscene material, Baker said.

FE (VN) Rogers
We Can't Withdraw From Vietnam

EXTENSION OF REMARKS OF

HON. PAUL G. ROGERS

OF FLORIDA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Thursday, June 24, 1965

Mr. ROGERS of Florida. Mr. Speaker, earlier this month the Fort Myers News-Press commented on the need for a continuing policy of strength in southeast Asia. It is pointed out that the war in Vietnam is not of our making, and is not of President Johnson's making—but it is our war all the same and it must be fought:

Perhaps if there were less talk of withdrawal the North Vietnamese might abandon the hopes they hold now that we will do so and be willing to talk terms.

I asked that this excellent editorial be printed here in the Record:

[From Fort Myers (Fla.) News-Press, June 18, 1965]

WE CAN'T WITHDRAW FROM VIETNAM

Now some 20,000 additional U.S. troops are being sent to South Vietnam, bringing the total of our fighting men there to 70,000. This troop buildup follows a buildup of planes and other armament there and more will probably follow for no end of the war is in sight. Instead of pouring more men, munitions and money into what seems now to be a hopeless struggle in some far-away jungle, should we give up and withdraw and let the Communist Vietcong have the country? That's what is advocated in certain quarters.

Those who advocate it are not necessarily Communists or Communist sympathizers. Many of them are perfectly loyal Americans who sincerely feel our policy there is wrong and that it will lead to war on a larger scale, which perhaps it will. But they can have little conception of why we're in Vietnam and what the stakes are that we're fighting for there.

The war in Vietnam is but part of a general Communist assault on the whole of free Asia which is now taking shape. Vietnam is the most important front and it may be the decisive one but it is far from the only one. In Laos the government is under attack by insurgent Pathet Lao forces led and supplied by North Vietnamese. In Malaysia there are constant efforts at terrorism and infiltration by Sukarno's Communist agents from Indonesia. In Burma, the government is fighting Communist guerrillas who control key areas. In Thailand a foothold has been established by Communist agents and a definite pattern of subversion is now emerging. In the Philippines the Huk guerrillas are becoming active again and control a number of villages by terror.

A lie circulated by the Communist propaganda apparatus is that these insurgencies throughout Asia and others elsewhere are all inspired by the quest for social justice and economic progress on the part of the masses.

Actually in all the free countries of Asia that the Communists seek to liberate there have been great social, economic, and political gains. In the Communist-dominated areas there has been systematic impoverishment of the people both materially and spiritually.

The free people of Asia generally realize this, they seek to resist communism and they want and need our help. A recent editorial in the Indian Economic Review, semiofficial publication of the All India Congress Committee, says: "Nothing should deter lovers of freedom and democracy to make every effort to thwart Communist China's overrunning the vulnerable southeast Asia, for if our neighbors of southeast Asia succumb, we have no chance of survival. If the United States, which obviously realizes the tremendous danger of expansionist Communist China, keeps aloof from this area, man's freedom is at stake." Note the last sentence—not just India's survival but "man's freedom."

So if the United States should withdraw from Vietnam, then where in Asia would we hold the line against the advance of communism? If we draw that line somewhere else it might well take a far greater effort to hold it there and risk an even greater escalation toward all-out war. And if we pull out entirely, we will assuredly be confronted with more "Vietnams" all over the world, including Latin America.

The war in Vietnam is not of our making but it is our war all the same. And although it is not clear at present how it is to be won, it must be fought. Perhaps if there were less talk of withdrawal the North Vietnamese might abandon the hopes they hold now that we will do so and be willing to talk terms.

The United Nations—Two Decades Old

SPEECH OF

HON. JAMES C. CLEVELAND

OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Thursday, June 24, 1965

Mr. CLEVELAND. Mr. Speaker, 20 years ago the United Nations came into being, invested with the hopes of men weary and torn by the most devastating general war in history. Since then, the roster of member nations has doubled and much has changed. Great strains threaten to rend the U.N., reflecting the strains within the international community. If there is trouble in the United Nations, and there is, it is not basically because of inherent defects within the structure. It is because of the failure of the membership to make it work. Fundamentally, the structure of the U.N. is sound and it would work if the members chose to make it work.

We in New Hampshire have a special interest in the United Nations because, in 1945, the question of whether the United States should endorse the proposal for the U.N. was put to the voters in the spring town meetings. It won overwhelming approval and this was, I believe, the only time when the question was put directly to the people anywhere in the country. In addition, the United Nations Building itself contains a quantity of New Hampshire granite.

As we reflect on the past 20 years and endeavor to fathom the future, let us

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salute the United Nations for its past accomplishments and strive to correct its faults. Its success is dependent upon the goodwill of men and nations. Let it not fail because of any lack of goodwill on our part.

Barbara Ann Lynch: Heroine

EXTENSION OF REMARKS OF

HON. WILLIAM T. CAHILL

OF NEW JERSEY

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Wednesday, June 30, 1965

Mr. CAHILL. Mr. Speaker, by an act of Congress the President is authorized each year to award Young American Medals for outstanding bravery and service demonstrated by our young American boys and girls. This year four recipients were named by Attorney General Nicholas deB. Katzenbach and today I had the pleasure of attending the White House ceremony and personally meeting three of these recipients. The award in the other case regrettably was granted posthumously to the parents of the young heroine who died in an effort to save her young brother from a fire.

I was particularly delighted that Barbara Ann Lynch, age 16, of Atco, N.J., a community in the First Congressional District which I have the honor to represent in the House of Representatives, was one of the four recipients. I know that the Members of the Congress will be pleased to learn that Barbara Ann, who was born on August 24, 1948, to Mr. and Mrs. Farrell Joseph Lynch, of Atco, and who is a junior at Camden Catholic High School in Cherry Hill, N.J., truly earned her award by a demonstration of outstanding courage and bravery.

On the morning of November 10, 1963, Barbara, who was then 15, discovered that there was a blaze in the living room of the family's frame home. She awakened her father who then roused his wife and son and all of them safely left the home. Once out on the street, however, Barbara noticed the absence of her 90-year-old grandmother and dashed back into the flaming bedroom for the purpose of rescuing her.

It became immediately apparent to her that it was impossible for her to lead or to carry her grandmother, who was an invalid, out of the home, so she helped the sick woman out of the bed and onto the floor, covered her with a blanket, shut the door and then lay across her grandmother to protect her from the flames.

Barbara's father was prevented from returning because of the intense heat and smoke and as a result, Barbara and her grandmother were overcome by smoke and suffered third degree burns before firemen were able to enter and carry them to safety.

Members of the Atco volunteer fire company were amazed to observe the unselfish devotion and the courageous heroics of such a young girl.

Knowing the Lynch family personally, I was particularly delighted to see the

Attorney General and the President single her out of many nominees for this high award.

I know that I speak for all of the citizens of the First Congressional District and, indeed, for all the citizens of the United States when I say to Barbara Ann Lynch, "Well done."

It is demonstration of this type of courage that renews the confidence of all of us in the youth of America. I believe that this entire program is a worthwhile one and I sincerely hope that Congress will in the future increase the number of possible recipients as an encouragement and inspiration to the boys and girls of America.

Once again, I congratulate Barbara Ann and her entire family and wish them many years of good health and God's blessings.

Joe Maldonado, Los Angeles' Antipoverty Chief, a Highly Respected Professional Administrator

EXTENSION OF REMARKS OF

HON. EDWARD R. ROYBAL

OF CALIFORNIA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Monday, June 14, 1965

Mr. ROYBAL. Mr. Speaker, I would like to take this opportunity to insert in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD an excellent article from the June 21, 1965, edition of the Los Angeles Times on Mr. Joe P. Maldonado, the highly respected executive director of the Los Angeles Youth Opportunities Board.

The article, written by Times' staff writer Paul Weeks, is a fine study of one of the top professional administrators now working in the national effort to wage a successful war on poverty in America.

Mr. Maldonado's personal background and experience, in addition to his education and motivation, have prepared him well for the challenging and often times difficult task of organizing and coordinating the antipoverty program in the Los Angeles area.

Los Angeles has already received approximately \$12 million in Federal assistance under this program, and should continue to be among the chief beneficiaries of the Johnson administration's promising new approach to solving the tragic paradox of extreme poverty for some 30 million disadvantaged citizens, in the midst of an all-time record prosperity for most Americans.

The ultimate success of this worthwhile effort in Los Angeles will depend in large measure on the determination and proven executive ability of such outstanding community leaders as Mr. Joe Maldonado.

The Los Angeles Times article follows:

MALDONADO WALKS TIGHTROPE IN WAR ON
POVERTY

(By Paul Weeks)

A political tightrope between three sectors of the war on poverty here vibrates nervously these days to the toe-dancing of a 230-pounder who has no yen at all for the high wire.

Round-jowled Joe P. Maldonado, 43, climbed out on it at the insistence of the youth opportunities board—which he serves as executive director—because he's the only man anyone could think of who wouldn't immediately draw sniper fire from one sector or another.

Maldonado's job is to try to induce the contestants to establish a screening agency for community antipoverty projects so they will go back to fighting poverty instead of each other.

His assignment by the all-government board to mediate drew the endorsement of the economic opportunity federation, in which the private welfare agencies' strength lies, and from Mayor Samuel W. Yorty, flag-bearer for city hall's interests.

At the same time, a silent prayer was offered up for Maldonado by kingpins in the community war on poverty committee, dominated by Negro and Mexican-American organizations which claim to hold vigil for the interests of the poor themselves.

Proof that he was the acceptable choice lay in the privately expressed fears from all sides that someone else might shoot him down, endangering the professional job he had done initially in launching the poverty war here.

That program, hailed all the way to Washington as perhaps the best in the Nation, is stalled. The youth opportunity board was a temporary expedient to get it started.

But failure to reorganize to meet Federal requirements for policy level participation by the private agencies and the poor has left the youth opportunity board stranded. Washington is bypassing it to fund local projects directly.

Within 3 days after Maldonado began to mediate, reports emanated that the deadlock was loosening, but there were still major areas of disagreement.

Maldonado's qualifications to soothe the disputants are unique. Besides being an on-the-job, \$25,000-a-year pro, he has lived and worked in all three camps—Government, private agency and minority-group poverty area.

You might say he started his own personal war on poverty the day he was born, June 29, 1921, in the northern New Mexico coal-mining town of Dawson, population of 1,000 then, now obliterated from the map.

"Dad was a coal miner, when there was work, brought up by the railroads from Aguascalientes, Mex., before the first war," Maldonado said.

Joe's mother, with no schooling has never learned to speak English or to read or write. His father, self-taught, had only 8 months of school. Joe learned Spanish first.

But Operation Headstart, the 1965 program to prepare culturally deprived children for an equal footing when they start school, had its parallel in Dawson:

"There was a little girl named Maguire," Joe recalls with a grin. "She taught me English, and I taught her Spanish."

In 1931 with the depression, the father, Jose, faced 6 desperate years without work. Joe, youngest of four children, started work at 10 for his board and room.

"I pumped gas, worked in the general store and delivered groceries for a family in nearby Colfax. Sometimes they'd load a pickup full of food for me to take home. For a while there, I was the only one bringing home groceries."

His motivation to go on to high school, he admits, was to get off a \$1-a-day job on a farm, "milking cows and slopping hogs at 4 a.m.," and driving a hay rake or a mower behind a team of horses.

He earned his room and board in another little town of Maxwell, working for his high school teacher and coach, now Dr. Curtis Martin, head of the department of political science at the University of Colorado.

Probably Joe was never paid better in his life—in inspiration.

dren of lawlessness and disciples of destruction. They are people who cloak themselves in the roles of civil righters but plot and plan in secret to disrupt our fight for justice and full citizenship. They must be unmasked for the frauds that they are, they must be fought in every arena."

He stated that he had seen known Communists passing out throwaways and helping to deliver placards to pickets on and about his campus.

The Kansas City Times of Wednesday, May 19, published an Associated Press dispatch about the lawless demonstrations in progress on the campus of the University of Wisconsin. It said that one of the leaders openly espoused, from a public rostrum on the campus, that "the students should band together to bring down the Government by any means."

It also said that the "demonstrations" there had now been infiltrated and were being led by "eight to a dozen" ringleaders who are operating under "pretty good cover"; that at least some of them are known members of the DuBois Clubs of America, which Senator Dodd and J. Edgar Hoover have recently described as a "new Communist-oriented youth organization dominated and controlled by the Communists."

These lawless activities, nauseating as they are, can hardly be surprising, for they are, purely and simply, some of the results that we should have known would inevitably come from tolerating open and direct preachments to defy and violate the law.

A very recent issue of U.S. News & World Report [May 17, 1965] contains two pertinent articles. One saying that "increased Communist penetration and influence inside some sections of the Negro movement in the United States is a subject of growing concern to the FBI and White House." The other saying, "J. Edgar Hoover, FBI Director, and President Johnson both are increasingly concerned by the growing activity of known Communists on the campuses of colleges around the country. They would like to alert the country to the situation, but are concerned about being considered 'Red-baiters' if they do."

I, for one, would like to lend a voice of encouragement to them to forget those fears and to alert the country fully about the facts, for surely that is their duty and no odium can result from exposing those who are preaching and practicing defiance of our law and, hence, the destruction of our society.

There are, of course, first duties of citizenship, but there are also first duties of Government. It is undoubtedly true, as recited in the theme of the presidentially proclaimed Law Day, 1965, that "a citizen's first duty is to uphold the law," but it is also a first duty of Government to enforce the law—to do so by prosecuting and punishing those who violate our criminal laws.

In no other way can our people be secure from assaults and trespasses upon their persons and property, or maintain an ordered and moral society.

Because some of our citizens will not voluntarily perform their "first duty" to uphold the law, our Governments, State and Federal, have the paramount duty of, at least, making them obey it.

We have all along been told, and many of us have preached, that crime does not pay, but the recent rash and spread of law defiance, and the successes—however, tenuous and temporary—of that philosophy in attaining goals, seems to compel a reappraisal of that concept, for, from what we see currently happening, one could reasonably believe that certain types of crimes are being permitted to pay.

PUBLIC APATHY AND LAWLESSNESS

Probably because of a rather widespread recognition that, at times and in certain sectors, some of our colored brethren have suf-

fered unconstitutional discriminations, and because many of us have been sympathetic to the ends they seek—and have not, therefore, thought very much about the destructive means they have embarked upon to attain those ends—there has been a rather general public apathy toward their preachments to violate, and their practices in violating, our laws.

Indeed, one of those who first advised, and was most successful in inducing, his followers to take the law into their own hands—and who, now that their conduct has led to widespread disorder, attempts to excuse his responsibility for it with the doubtless true statement: "I cannot control them"—parenthetically, an excuse quite reminiscent of the one given by the man who lighted the squib and threw it into the crowd—was rather recently twice honored. Once by an old and respected American university by conferring upon him an honorary degree—not in some new political science—but in law, and, second, by an honored foreign cultural group by awarding him a prize for, of all things, his contributions to peace.

What, I would like to ask, has happened to our sense of values?

But a recent article in the May 3, 1965, issue of U.S. News & World Report hints at a new and different appraisal of this conduct, and indicates some official impatience with this gentleman's apparent insatiable appetite for power, and some displeasure at his recently voiced criticism of the administration's foreign policies in Vietnam and elsewhere—concluding with the statement that "some Washington observers profess to see an attempt [by this gentleman] to 'escalate' his status as a national figure—perhaps with political goals in view."

This is heartening, as it indicates a new awareness of the inevitable destruction of ordered liberty that must be expected if we continue to allow any of our citizens to incite others to disobey the law—to take it into their own hands, and to get away with it.

Whatever may have been the provocations—and, doubtless, there have been some—no man, or any group or race of men, can be permitted, in a government of laws, to take the law, or what they think ought to be the law, into their own hands, for that is anarchy, and sure to result in chaos.

The fact that the provocations may have been themselves constitutionally unlawful cannot justify unlawful means for their resolution.

Both types of conduct are wrong—constitutionally wrong, the one as much as the other. And, obviously, two wrongs cannot make a right.

All discriminations that violate the Constitution and laws of the United States are readily redressable in our courts, which have always been open to all citizens. And no one has any room to doubt that, if he will resort to those courts, and have the patience to await their processes—as we all must do in an ordered society—all his constitutional and legal rights will be vouchsafed to him, whatever his creed or color.

But there has been impatience with the judicial processes, manifested by the recent hue and cry for "action now—not the delays of the law."

Certainly this cliché, too, advocates such direct action as amounts to a clear call for disobedience of the laws, the judgments of the courts and of all constituted authority and lawful processes.

It is true that legal processes, being refined and deliberative processes, are slow.

But like the mills of the gods, though they grind slowly, they grind exceedingly fine, and their judgments are most likely to be just.

In all events, there is no other fair and orderly way to decide the issues that arise among us, and to have an ordered liberty.

Every ordered society in history has found

it necessary to establish laws, and courts fairly to interpret and enforce them; and the same history makes clear, too, that the first evidences of a society's decay may be seen in its toleration of disrespect for, and disobedience of, its laws and the judgments of its courts.

HOW MINORITY GROUPS CAN LOSE OUT

The great pity here is that these minority groups, in preaching and practicing defiance of the law, are, in fact, advocating erosion and destruction of the only structure that can ever assure to them, or permanently maintain for them, due process of law and the equal protection of the laws, and that can, thus, protect them from discriminations and abuses by majorities.

In May 1965, Mr. Lewis F. Powell, president of the American Bar Association, in a speech dedicating the new Missouri Bar Center at Jefferson City, said, "Many centuries of human misery show that once a society departs from the rule of law, and every man becomes the judge of which laws he will obey, only the strongest remain free," and also that "those who break the great tradition of respect and tolerance for the differing views of others by resorting to coercion, whether 'violent' or 'nonviolent,' menace the spirit of responsible inquiry essential to [our] institutions." "No 'end,'" he said, "however worthy [can ever] justify resort to unlawful means."

He concluded with the statement that "America needs a genuine revival of respect for law and orderly processes, a reawakening of individual responsibility, a new impatience with those who violate and circumvent laws, and a determined insistence that laws be enforced, courts respected and due process followed." To this, I say amen.

Surely we must always strive to eliminate injustice and discrimination, but we must do so by orderly processes in the legislatures and the courts, and not by defying their processes and actions, nor by taking the laws into our own hands.

We must take the laws into our hearts rather than into our hands, and seek redress in the courts rather than in the streets.

A very recent issue of the Kansas City Star contained several articles about the general breakdown of law and order on our college campuses.

One of them fairly puts the finger on the cause. It did so through quoting one of the "demonstrating" students. He was asked why some students had abandoned historical "panty raids" and similar college pranks for open and riotous rebellion. "Why," he said, "you could get kicked out of school for conducting a panty raid and things of that kind, but no one is ever kicked out or punished for demonstrating for something like civil rights."

It is thus plain that the students, knowing just as everyone else knows, that open and riotous rebellion in the name of "civil rights" is not being punished, but is being tolerated, have been thus encouraged to wage and spread rebellion.

Another of these articles quoted some comments of J. Edgar Hoover about the effects of spreading crime upon the peace and safety of our citizens. He said: "There is too much concern in this country * * * for the 'rights' of an individual who commits a crime."

"I think he is entitled to his [legal rights], but I think the citizens of this country ought to be able to walk all the streets of our cities without being mugged, raped, or robbed." But, he said, we can't do so today, and he added: "All through the country, almost without exception, this condition prevails."

The April 10, 1965, issue of the magazine America contained an article on the imperative need for certain and severe punishment of crime, which made many pertinent observations, including this one:

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"[Government] has no right to turn the cheek of its citizens. Instead, it is gravely obligated—by the very purpose of its existence—to see to their protection.

"Sure and swift punishment [is our only way] to guarantee that protection * * *. We stand in need of sure, swift, tough punishment if we expect to decrease the crime rate, and to protect the great mass of our upright citizens."

To this, too, I can only say amen.

The causes are plain. We have, in high places, tolerated and even encouraged preachments to break the law—such as: "Obey the good laws but break the bad ones," which, of course, means to obey only the laws you like; and such as: "Action now, not the delays of the law," which is, of course, a call for direct action outside the law and the courts.

And we have also tolerated and in some high places have even encouraged, the actual defiance of the law which those preachments have advocated and brought into existence, and which have now spread to all areas of the Nation, and seriously threaten the breakdown of law, order, and morality.

REMEDY: DEMAND RESPECT FOR LAW

The remedy is equally plain. It is simply to insist that our Governments, State and Federal, reassume and discharge their first duty of protecting the people against lawless invasions of their persons and property and from assaults upon their liberties by demanding and commanding respect for law and legal processes through the impartial, evenhanded, vigorous, swift, and certain enforcement of our criminal laws and the real and substantial punishment thereunder of all conduct that violates those laws.

These are not platitudes, but are fundamentals and vital, as every thinking man should see, to the survival of our Nation.

In no other way can we orderly resolve the issues that confront and divide us, or live together in peace and harmony as a civilized nation of brother under the fatherhood of God.

FE

VN Wilson

Battleship Need Cited in Fight for Vietnam Plain

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

OF

HON. BOB WILSON

OF CALIFORNIA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Wednesday, June 30, 1965

Mr. BOB WILSON. Mr. Speaker, the following newspaper article clearly outlines the need for beefing up our naval forces off Vietnam. It was written by one of today's best informed men, Brig. Gen. James D. Hittle, U.S. Marine Corps, retired, and appeared in the June 21 edition of the San Diego Union. General Hittle has just returned from nearly a month in South Vietnam and the Far East and his views merit considerable attention of all our colleagues:

[From the San Diego (Calif.) Union, June 21, 1965]

FOUR STILL IN MOTHBALLS: BATTLESHIP NEED CITED IN FIGHT FOR VIETNAM PLAIN

(By Brig. Gen. James D. Hittle, U.S. Marine Corps, retired, director of National Security and Foreign Affairs, Veterans of Foreign Wars)

WASHINGTON.—The sooner the mothballing comes off our World War II battleships, and

the quicker they sail for South Vietnam, the better.

The U.S. Navy still has four of those fast, huge, heavily armored, and big-gunned ships. Combat proven, they have been sleeping in the quiet waters of back channels. They could well prove to be a most important and timely weapon in Vietnam.

No, we don't need them in southeast Asia to repel a Communist fleet of coastal junks, nor to fight off Red torpedo attacks in the Tonkin Gulf. We need these battlewagons to make sure that we win the battle for the coastal plain of South Vietnam—and win it with the least possible casualties for ourselves and the South Vietnamese.

The heavy fighting around Quang-Nai, Da Nang, and Chu Lai marks the beginning of a new phase of the war—the struggle for the coastal plain. It could well be the decisive phase.

It doesn't take intricate staff analysis to realize why this narrow strip along the South China Sea is so important. It is the food-producing and population center for the vast area north of Saigon. Also, through this seacoast flatland runs the main north-south highway and rail line. Both are presently unserviceable for long stretches due to Communist bridge blowing and roadblocks.

PLAIN BECOMING CRITICAL AREA IN WAR

The portion of the plain from the Phu Bai region southward through Da Nang to the Marine beachhead at Chu Lai is becoming the critical area of conflict. It about 100 miles long, and in its broader portions is 5 to 10 miles wide.

The Vietcong commanders know that if they can't control the coastal plain with its food supply, they'll be in logistic trouble. If they have to fall back into the fast-rising foothills and the inhospitable forested mountains, they will have to devote more time to finding food and less to fighting.

It is difficult to imagine a more suitable area for battleship gunfire. These ships are the most powerful and mobile concentrations of precise, weather-immune, long-range shore bombardment weapons ever made. Each has nine 16-inch guns. They fire a projectile of 1½ tons almost 20 miles. Also, each ship has 20 5-inch guns for air defense and surface targets.

Vietcong attacks are being stepped up. The Reds are hoping to do their damage during the monsoon which hampers our supporting aircraft. Also, Vietcong doctrine emphasizes night operations. Again the purpose is to cancel out our air advantage. But they won't have such advantages if we have a couple of battleships off the coast, blasting their concentrations regardless of weather or visibility.

NAVY SUPPORTING GUNFIRE DEVELOPED

During the Pacific campaigns of World War II, Navy-Marine amphibious doctrine developed naval supporting gunfire to a fine art. Since then it has been further perfected.

In the Korean war the *Missouri* steamed up and down the coast, pummeling the Reds along the shoreline and inland.

Naval gunfire already has been used in Vietnam. But so far only the 5-inch guns of destroyers and a few remaining 8-inch guns of a cruiser have been available. They are a big help, but not as devastating or decisive as the battlewagon's big guns.

With battleship firepower available but not used, it means that our forces in the coastal strip are having to fight a tough enemy under an unnecessary handicap of not having the best available weapons. Such handicaps mean unnecessary casualties.

Our advantage in South Vietnam is that the war is essentially maritime in character. We can bring to bear the weapons, logistics, and mobility of our overwhelming seapower. Having our backs to the sea, which we control, gives us the opportunity for victory.

Failure to exploit this advantage by using battleship guns to back up our forces means

rejection of seapower's most powerful and accurate all-weather bombardment weapon. It could also mean, figuratively, turning our back on the sea—and ultimate victory.

Tom Vail, a Man on the Move

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

OF

HON. ROBERT E. SWEENEY

OF OHIO

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Wednesday, June 30, 1965

Mr. SWEENEY. Mr. Speaker, I wish to draw the attention of the Members of the House to an article that appears in the July 5 issue of Newsweek magazine concerning Thomas Vail, a son of Princeton and the editor of the influential Cleveland Plain Dealer.

Tom Vail, for a good number of years, has been a member of the fourth estate in Ohio and has served from a cub reporter, all the way up the ladder, to become editor of one of America's largest newspapers.

Not only is Tom Vail a man of influence, but he is a gentleman of judgment who is keen and alert as to the public interest. In my opinion, he has been constructive in his analyses of city, State, and Federal issues. And while I might not always agree with the editorial comment of his newspaper on those issues, I do find myself in agreement in the majority of instances, and quite agree with Newsweek's analysis of his spectacular achievements in reforming the Cleveland Plain Dealer.

The Newsweek article follows:

TIGERISH

For a quarter of a century, Editor Louis B. Seltzer's afternoon Cleveland Press has been Ohio's most influential newspaper while the morning Cleveland Plain Dealer plodded behind, dispensing a bland diet of conscientious stodginess. "The Plain Dealer was run like a trusteeship," says Thomas Van Husen Vail, whose great-grandfather, mining millionaire Liberty Emery Holden, founded the paper in 1842. "Frankly, it didn't have any guts."

A cum laude graduate of Princeton, Tom Vail knows a successful idea when he sees it. In 1963, when he became editor and publisher of the Plain Dealer, Vail set out to whip the Scripps-Howard-owned Press on its own terms. The Plain Dealer's editorials, once ponderous and a week behind the news, became short, progressive, and current—like those in the Press. Makeup, once a grim gray, became bright and airy—like the Press. In the familiar Seltzer tradition, the Plain Dealer began crusading for such civic causes as a city payroll tax and a State university campus in Cleveland and started exposing crooks in the Longshoremen's Union and the foul conditions in a State mental hospital. The paper also cultivated Cleveland's numerous ethnic groups—as the Press had done for years—by running a weekly, page 1 series on each. Vail has accompanied his metamorphosis with a flourish of promotion. Just last week, for example, a 4-column, page-1 story boosted the paper's baseball clinic for ladies, where questions on the nuances of the game can be put to experts ranging from American League President Joe Cronin to Honey Alvis, wife of the Indians' third baseman.

PROFITS UP

Vail's decision to add a healthy charge of Seltzer to the fizzless Plain Dealer has paid

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a hard-working people, and a truly viable and important Congo emerging from its colonial past. Many of these experiences have been shared by the United States and we know and appreciate the extent of the problems that can arise for a nation passing from the shackles of colonialism to its chance for greatness.

As I congratulate the people and leaders of the Congo, then, on the progress that they have brought about, and on the success with which many of these problems have been met, it is with sincerity and a strong belief in the truly great future which is destined for their nation.

Mr. BINGHAM. Mr. Speaker, today is the fifth anniversary of the independence of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, commonly known as Congo—Léopoldville. I think it is appropriate that we should mark this day and that we should extend our congratulations to President Kasavubu, Prime Minister Tshombe, and their associates in the Government and to the people of the Congo.

While the history of the Congo as an independent state has been a turbulent one, we can be thankful on this day that it is a nation and that no major East-West conflict has developed within its vast territory. For these achievements, the United Nations can take a major share of the credit.

It is perhaps ironic that the man who for so long resisted the efforts of the United Nations to preserve the Congo as a unified state is today its Prime Minister. But the degree of Mr. Tshombe's shift of view is in itself a measure of the U.N.'s accomplishment.

In my judgment, history will give due credit to the extraordinary success of the unprecedented and incredibly difficult mission which the U.N. carried out during the first years of the Congo's independent existence. Under the leadership of Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld and of his successor, U Thant, an international military force prevented the nation from disintegrating into total chaos and prevented what might otherwise well have been a clash between the great powers. This same operation also made it possible for the many hundreds of technicians from the United Nations and its family of agencies to carry on the essential work of strengthening the Congolese state and its economy and of enabling it to meet its needs for highly educated and trained personnel in all fields of endeavor.

The Congo is a rich country and has a potentially great future. We in the United States extend our congratulations to the Congolese people and our best wishes for a speedy realization of that great future.

Mr. POWELL. Mr. Speaker, today, June 30, is an important day for the 15 million people of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, for it is the fifth anniversary of their independence. We therefore would like to take this occasion to extend warm felicitations to the Congo Republic; to His Excellency Joseph

Kasavubu, the President; His Excellency Moïse Tshombe, the Prime Minister; and to the Chargé d'Affaires ad interim of the Congo Republic to the United States, Joseph Ugolin Nzeza.

The history of the Congo has, unfortunately, been one of turmoil, unhappiness, and foreign interference. Yet, there have been periods of important and successful autonomous rule.

As early as the 13th century, there appeared in the Congo a powerful, unified indigenous state—the Kingdom of the Bakongo. The kingdom's predominance was greatest from 1500 to 1650. It was during this early period that Europeans first became aware of the Congo.

External influence, inaugurated by the Portuguese Diogo Cão in 1483, led to an unfortunate and extensive depopulation of the Congo Basin by slave traders between the 15th and 20th centuries. The terrible losses and cruelties inflicted upon the oppressed Congolese were finally ameliorated when the slave trade was outlawed in the latter part of the 19th century.

European exploration of the Congo took place mainly under the auspices of King Leopold II of Belgium, whose interest was stimulated by the adventures of Stanley in the 1880's. From 1885 to 1908, the Congo Free State was the personal property of the King. In 1908, however, the King ceded the Congo Free State to the Belgian Government and it remained a Belgian colony until 1960. Finally, after 75 years of Belgian rule, the Congo achieved its freedom on June 30, 1960.

Now, once again, the people of the Democratic Republic of the Congo are free and independent; and are striving to exercise the position of importance and leadership that should be theirs as one of the largest and wealthiest nations in Africa.

Manufacturing, mining, and agriculture are all well developed in the Congo. Income from the export of copper, diamonds, cobalt, tin, coffee, palm oil, cotton, rubber, cocoa, and other products has been well used to build a fine educational system, transport facilities, public and private health centers, and many hydroelectric powerplants.

Agricultural resources have been increased through extensive research that has proved of great value. Last year's total exports rose 4.6 percent and Government gold reserves were also up substantially. As is the case with many of its African neighbors, the Democratic Republic of the Congo has only begun to realize its great potential. Its industrial, mineral, agricultural, and human resources are indeed tremendous.

Unfortunately, these 5 years since independence have not been happy ones for the people of the Congo. Numerous rebellions and civil wars have disrupted the political unity and economic progress of this large country, to the dismay of the Congolese, myself, and the entire world. Now, however, we have great hopes that the worst is over, and that effective leadership will lead to the nec-

essary political stability and economic progress that we all desire to see in this country.

It is, then, with great pleasure that I congratulate the people of the Democratic Republic of the Congo on this, the fifth anniversary of their independence, and I know that in this I am joined by my distinguished colleagues.

GENERAL LEAVE TO EXTEND

Mr. O'HARA of Illinois. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that any of my colleagues who so desire may have 5 days in which to extend their remarks on this subject.

The SPEAKER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

There was no objection.

RUSSIAN FISHERY ON AMERICAN SHORE

(Mr. WYATT asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. WYATT. Mr. Speaker, our American fisherman in the North Pacific have been besieged from all sides during the past few months. The normal problems of nature have been multiplied many times by threats from abroad. First, we had the devastation to the Alaska salmon fishery caused by the callous disregard of any conservation principles when the Japanese moved their large mother ships into the area adjacent to Alaska to make huge catches of American species salmon attempting to return to Alaskan rivers. Our people have protested and some have even attempted to organize a boycott of all Japanese imports in retaliation. These ships have moved away finally, but early evidence indicates that they have done their damage prior to moving.

Now we have another serious threat, which I feel duty-bound to bring to the attention of the Congress and the American people. For a number of weeks now, Russian mother ships have been operating brazenly close, off the mouth of the Columbia River. We have complained time and again to the State Department. These ships operate as close as 15 miles to the Columbia River lightship. They have satellite trawlers which fish and deliver their catches to the Russian mother ship. They fish with nets and apparently have every modern fishing device.

At my request, our own American fishermen have taken several pictures of these Russian ships, close to the shores of Oregon and Washington, and I have several right here for display. Such experienced and competent fishermen as Jim Parker and Arthur Anderson of Astoria, Oreg., have seen them with their own eyes.

I again call upon our State Department to protest against this Russian fishery on the American shore. I bring this startling discovery to the floor of the Congress to point out how far the Russians have gone, and I must speculate with our fishermen that these Russian

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fleets may not be so close off our shores for purposes of fishing only.

CONGRESSIONAL BASEBALL GAME

(Mr. AYRES asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute.)

Mr. AYRES. Mr. Speaker, oftentimes we are so troubled with the serious problems of the world that we forget there is a great national pastime in this country and the public can relax by witnessing a baseball game.

I am very proud to announce, although I know most of you have read the sports pages, that the Cleveland Indians are in first place. They will be at the stadium this evening, playing against the Senators.

Prior to that there will be a game that is always of great interest to the American public. It is one time when the Republicans, even though we are in the minority, have an opportunity to defeat the Democrats.

I refer to the congressional baseball game this evening starting at 6:30. Prior to that there will be a reception in the Rayburn Building. There will be free transportation out to the wonderful stadium that this Congress voted to build some years ago.

We will see you there.

OUTSTANDING OUTDOOR DRAMA IN WESTERN NORTH CAROLINA

(Mr. BROYHILL of North Carolina asked and was given permission to extend his remarks at this point in the Record.)

Mr. BROYHILL of North Carolina. Mr. Speaker, this past weekend, one of America's finest historical pageants began its 14th season with the opening performance on June 25 of Kermit Miller's "Horn in the West" at Boone, N.C. The drama will continue nightly except Mondays throughout the summer until August 28, honoring the 203d anniversary of Daniel Boone's pioneering efforts through the Blue Ridge Mountains of North Carolina.

Through the years of its production, "Horn in the West" has taken its place among the handful of great historical dramas being played in outdoor amphitheaters throughout the country which have brought pleasure and a deeper awareness of the great heritage of the American people. We in the Ninth District of North Carolina are proud, indeed, of this colorful spectacle which brings to life the struggles of our forefathers to conquer the frontier and press forward the settlement of the wilderness of the forbidding mountain frontier and the rich land beyond.

Many of you in this Chamber have joined with the tens of thousands of fellow Americans who have relived the exploits of Daniel Boone and his hardy pioneers depicted in "Horn in the West." However, the production of this drama itself is no less interesting, representing as it does the hard work, imagination, and faith of a number of men who believed strongly that Boone's story should be preserved and dramatized.

Indeed, "Horn in the West" is the realization of a dream of the descendants of men and women of the Blue Ridge Mountains whose qualities are so well characterized by the self-reliant Daniel Boone. In this production, they have formed a medium for collecting, preserving, and transmitting this rich heritage.

The beginning of the outdoor drama institution was the organization of the Southern Appalachian Historical Association, chartered and incorporated as a nonprofit historical organization on December 9, 1951. The officers and board members were elected and committees appointed so that work on the production, which was to be presented for the first time on June 27, 1952, could begin.

Dr. I. G. Greer was elected president; Dr. D. J. Whitener, executive vice president; Mrs. Earleen Pritchett, secretary; and James Marsh, treasurer. Elected to the board of directors were R. E. Agle, Mrs. Constance Stallings, G. C. Robbins, Clyde R. Greene, Herman W. Wilcox, Ralph Winkler, Stanley Harris, and Dr. R. H. Harmon.

A young playwright, Kermit Hunter, author of the successful outdoor drama, "Unto These Hills," was commissioned to write the script. After considerable research, the play was written and the title selected—"Horn in the West."

And there was a theater to be built. A site had to be chosen. All available land in the area was inspected by various members of the association. A location on the property of Jones Winkler was chosen. A perfect setting for the amphitheater was found in a mountain grove behind the Winkler home. Land had to be cleared for parking areas, the grounds had to be landscaped and the theater, itself, had to be constructed. Three separate stages were to be built so that not only the panoramic effect could be achieved but during the playing of the drama one or even two stages could be set while the third was being used.

During 3 short months from March to June, a miracle took place. The show was completely put together. A magnificent outdoor theater seating 2,500 persons was constructed. This 3-month feat came about through the cooperation and spirit of teamwork exercised by civic-minded members of the entire town of Boone and Blowing Rock. It was, in some aspects, the same type of teamwork exercised a few hundred years ago by their forefathers who conquered the wilderness and built an empire.

Today, the "Horn in the West" outdoor drama is still sponsored by the Southern Appalachian Historical Association. Several persons who participated in the creation of the drama are still on the board. Dr. I. G. Greer is president. Dr. R. H. Harmon is executive vice president of the board's executive committee. Other officers are Sam Dixon, second vice president; Mrs. B. W. Stallings, chairman of the association membership; Lynn Holaday, treasurer; and Bob Allen, curator. Last year the association sent historical information, "Daniel Boone, the Empire Builder" to every intermediate, junior high, and high school

teaching American and State history, inviting them to submit essays for cash prizes. One thousand essays were entered.

General manager of "Horn in the West" is Herman W. Wilcox, also an original officer of the association. John Corey is public relations consultant.

It is my hope that as you travel through the magnificent mountains of North Carolina this summer, you will have the opportunity to pause for an evening at Boone, situated only a short distance from the Blue Ridge Parkway, to relive at a performance of "Horn in the West" a time in our national experience when firm foundations of this great Nation were being put down.

FE *Stagg* LETTER FROM A SON IN VIETNAM

(Mr. STAGGERS asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks and include extraneous matter.)

Mr. STAGGERS. Mr. Speaker, the Morgantown Post, a newspaper published in Morgantown, W. Va., has just printed a letter from a soldier fighting in Vietnam to his father. This young man is a worthy exponent of West Virginia realism. He loves his country, and he knows what that country has done for him. He has not had the advantage of a college training, but he seems to have learned a number of things that some of our pampered youth in college have not been taught. His letter shows clearly that he understands full well that liberty must be defended in every generation. He understands that our political and social institutions, with all their blessings to the American individual, are not free and inalienable gifts, but must be fought for continuously, or they will be lost forever.

As long as America produces young men like this one, we are safe. I am sorry I cannot say as much about either the youth or the older generation who do not value their heritage enough to defend it. I think this letter should contribute to national morale, and include it in the Record:

SABRATON DAD GETS A BIG THANK YOU. REPORT ON VIET CONFLICT—LETTER FROM SON IN VIETNAM BRIGHTENS FATHER'S DAY

(EDITOR'S NOTE.—AIC. David N. Musick, 21, son of Mr. and Mrs. John R. Musick of Sabraton, has been in Vietnam since April 11. His wife, Lana, and two children live at Randolph Air Force Base, San Antonio, Tex. Airman Musick, a 1960 graduate of Morgantown High, wrote this letter, which arrived in time to make the older Musick a proud and happy father.)

JUNE 15, 1965.

To the MOST WONDERFUL FATHER IN THE WORLD:

Well, Dad, seeing as how Sunday is Father's Day, and they don't have any Father's Day cards here, I thought I would write you a letter. I don't think I have ever written a letter to you personally, have I?

Things over here are pretty much the same except the Vietcong are stepping up their activities in the south and the Soviet Union is flying bombers into Hanoi, that is the capital of the Vietcong. I think things will get worse over here before they get better.

I feel very proud being able to help in the cause over here. I can truly say that I have fulfilled my obligation to my country when

my tour is over. Some people in the United States are against the United States being in Vietnam. Mostly college students. I think they are just afraid that they will have to come over here and fight. I think we are doing the right thing though. If the people back there only knew how awful the Communists are over here, they would be more than glad to come and fight to prevent the spreading of communism. We had to make our stand somewhere.

The other day, the Vietcong stopped a schoolbus outside Saigon and took a little 7-year-old girl off the bus and chopped every one of her fingers off because they didn't want the children attending the school that they were because they were teaching them the right things in life and they wanted to give people an example of what might happen to their children if they continued to go.

I'm sure those people in the United States wouldn't want this. If they could only see the looks on mothers' faces standing helplessly by watching the Vietcong torture their sons and husbands, dismantling their bodies, raping their daughters. People in the United States seem to think along the lines of "Well, it will never happen here, the hell with other people." I'm talking of the people who don't want us over here. But it surely will happen if we don't continue to fight it. I'm willing to go to any extremes to insure a safe country for my babies and Lana.

We have so much to be thankful for. So many people fought in World War II and died so that we could have a free country. I wish everyone could be at peace, but I guess that will never be. I watched a funeral the other day for eight servicemen killed over here. I just about cried. It seems so terrible to have to die in this lonely place away from your loved ones.

Dad, I think we children are among the luckiest children in the world to have such wonderful parents. I know at times you didn't think we appreciated all that you have done for us, but now that I am grown up and understand just how wonderful a father you have been, I am so thankful. I know there were times that I made you mad and I am sorry for this.

There are so many neglected children in this world. That's one thing we have never known. You worked so hard for your family to provide a nice home, food, and clothing. If there were only some way to repay you Dad, I surely would. But there are no words of thanks or any amount of gifts we could give to you to repay you for all the love and understanding you have shown us. I just pray to God that I can raise my children and do as good a job as you and mom have. I love you both so very much.

Thank you for everything you have ever done for us children, Dad. You are the most wonderful father anyone could ever ask for. I love you.

Your son,

DAVID.

THE LATE ED LYBECK

(Mr. ROOSEVELT asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. ROOSEVELT. Mr. Speaker, on June 26, 1965, my field representative, Ed Lybeck, suffered a fatal heart attack. He had been my field representative since January 3, 1955, when I was first elected to Congress from the 26th District of California.

To say that Ed performed his job with expertise, dedication and loyalty is not enough. There was infinitely much more that he gave to the office and constituents, to the community, to his fam-

ily and friends—and to me. Ed was known as a practical politician with ideals and dreams. He was honest and candid, but always patient and understanding, willing to help in any situation. His wit was legendary.

Ed Lybeck's death is a very deep personal loss to me, for he has been a true friend in need and in deed over the years, sharing my political and personal problems—and always available to counsel and advise. And, as any Californian in politics or in State, county, and city government will verify, Ed Lybeck's views and comments have been sought and respected by more people than any of us will ever know.

The accuracy of his analyses was due to a wide and varied background—with experiences including newspaper reporting, author, seaman, Government service with the NYA, city housing, and campaign management. Coupled with his keen insight, remarkable memory, almost uncanny perception—and, above all, a sense of responsibility toward his fellowman and his country, Ed Lybeck was truly an extraordinary human being.

Ed was buried in Los Angeles yesterday, and during my trip back, I thought of his family and countless friends who share my sorrow and feeling of loneliness. I share these few thoughts with you because many of my colleagues here were privileged to know Ed Lybeck and I am confident they will want to join me in honoring my beloved friend, and a great American citizen.

I cannot hope to ever find another Ed Lybeck—but I can be grateful for the time together we had, and his memory will forever remain in my heart.

"TRAIL OF THE LONESOME PINE" BEGINS SECOND SEASON JULY 1

(Mr. JENNINGS asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. JENNINGS. Mr. Speaker, I would like to call to the attention of the Members of the 89th Congress, and to place in the Record, information on a most important event in my district.

On Thursday evening, July 1, the second season of a very fine outdoor drama begins. The "Trail of the Lonesome Pine" will be staged each Thursday, Friday, and Saturday night from July 1 through September 6, in an amphitheater at the June Tolliver House, Big Stone Gap, Wise County, Va. This drama is an adaptation of the famous novel of John Fox, Jr., by Mr. Earl Hobson Smith, of Harrogate, Tenn. It was first produced last year and was excellent in every respect.

I had the privilege of attending one of the performances last year. I plan to be there again on Saturday night to enjoy the work of the many people who participate to make this project a success.

I am proud to represent the many people involved in producing the "Trail of the Lonesome Pine." They have planned and performed the entire project with ability, initiative, courage, and spirit that are typical of the people of the area. It has been, in every sense of

the word, a "bootstrap" effort. The results have been excellent for the economy and the success of the project has strengthened the determination of this area to promote economic growth and development. In this instance, they have produced a fine drama and have made a very significant contribution to the culture of the region.

To further explain the pride we have in this drama, it not only is based upon a book written by John Fox, Jr., who lived at Big Stone Gap for many years, its setting is in Wise County, where the town of Appalachia is located. We have all heard of the Appalachian region during the past few months. This is a part of Appalachia and I want my colleagues to know that we produce fine and talented people, and that we have a project here that is all local and has not required any Government funds. There has been much discussion about the use of local scenic attractions and activities to bring tourists to a specific area as a means of economic development. This is being accomplished by the Big Stone Gap area residents, who have all pitched in to make this drama a success.

Mr. Speaker, I would hope that many of my colleagues will find occasion to travel into the southwest Virginia-eastern Kentucky region during the summer. I would tell them that a most enjoyable evening can be spent in Wise County, where the people are friendly, the food and accommodations are excellent, and the entertainment at our outdoor drama superb. I invite and urge them to attend.

An article on this drama recently appeared in the L. & N. magazine, which is published by the famous railroad serving the region. Under leave to extend my remarks in the Record, I include the major part of this article.

[From the L. & N. magazine, June 1965]

"TRAIL OF THE LONESOME PINE"—MUSICAL DRAMA WILL OPEN ITS SECOND SEASON IN JULY

Next month at Big Stone Gap, deep in the mountains of Virginia, the curtain goes up on one of America's most unique outdoor musical dramas.

Based faithfully on the book, "Trail of the Lonesome Pine," by Kentucky native, John Fox, Jr., the locally-staged production will be enacted in a setting that is authentic right down to the soft whispering of the wind through the nearby pine trees.

On opening night, July 1, likely all of the 1,000 seats in the amphitheater located on the lawn behind the June Tolliver House (more about this later) will be filled. The drama itself is an effort of those who are natives of the land where the author lived and wrote. Even the cast includes a sprinkling of some who were born during the tumultuous, booming days of John Fox, Jr.'s, stories, and their portrayal of the characters he created are doubly convincing.

Spearheaded by Mrs. Creed P. Kelly, president of the Lonesome Pine Arts and Crafts Association, the production is being repeated this summer with high hopes of a season even more successful than the first one.

"We have gathered together all possible human resources—talents musical, mechanical, artistic, and dramatic," she said. "We here in Big Stone Gap are surrounded by the beauty of our mountains which Mr. Fox loved so well. With this backdrop, we are inviting as many visitors as possible to stop

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by this summer and live again with us, those days of yore."

The drama has been adapted by Earl Hodson Smith, chairman of the speech and dramatics department, Lincoln Memorial University, Harrogate, Tenn. It is being presented through special permission of the author's sister, Mrs. William Cabell Moore, the former Elizabeth Fox, only surviving member of the family, and still a resident of Big Stone Gap.

All the familiar characters of the book are in the play: Young June Tolliver; "Devil Judd" Tolliver, the shotgun-totin' head of the clan; Bud, Bad Rufe, and Cousin Dave Tolliver; Jack Hale, Red Fox, and many others. In all, there are more than 25 speaking parts, and the production is augmented by an 18-voice chorus, numerous square dancers and assorted musicians. It will be presented each Thursday, Friday, and Saturday evening through September 6.

There is a great deal of John Fox, Jr., still in existence at Big Stone Gap. Although he is buried in the family plot in a cemetery at Paris, Ky., where he was born (he died in 1919), according to Mrs. Kelly, his spirit still lingers over the mountains of southwest Virginia and eastern Kentucky, an area he loved and where he spent most of his creative years.

Citizens of Big Stone still talk about the author as if they half expect to see him come riding along on horseback, or, at least, come walking down the street accompanied by one or more of his dogs. The home in which he wrote most of his books, still stands near the edge of town, in a grove of trees, mostly pines. His sister, Mrs. Moore, has kept his study and desk just as he left them.

No visit to Big Stone Gap is complete without a stop at the June Tolliver House on Jerome and Clinton Streets. Recently purchased by the association, the house has been carefully restored and furnished throughout with items of the period. An upstairs bedroom was occupied by young June's real-life counterpart when she came to town to attend school. The house is open daily except Mondays, and visitors on the free, conducted tours, may look from the same window through which June looked one moonlit night during a romantic episode in the book.

The association, a nonprofit organization, is attempting to preserve the cultural heritage, crafts and traditions of the proud mountain people of that area. Classes in many of the creative arts, are held at the June Tolliver House, including painting, quilting, weaving, pottery, ceramics and other crafts of mountain life, using resources available in the vicinity. Instructors volunteer their time and abilities and freely share their knowledge with others. In a showroom on the first floor, the handmade articles are on display and available for purchase. One is offered of finding authentic items designed and produced by skilled mountain craftsmen.

There is a lot to see in the John Fox, Jr., country, and a visit to this dramatic offering this summer is a good way to begin a tour that will take you well "along the Trail of the Lonesome Pine."

PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT

(Mr. ROOSEVELT asked and was given permission to extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD and to include letters, tables, and materials furnished by the Wage and Hour Division of the Department of Labor.)

Mr. ROOSEVELT. Mr. Speaker, on June 15, 1965, I submitted for the RECORD certain responses of the Department of Labor to questions raised during present hearings on proposed amendments to the Fair Labor Standards Act.

I herewith submit 12 additional responses, and a supplement to data in the June 15 RECORD, for the information of my colleagues and the general public.

I consider this legislation so important, and its impact so great, that I want to keep everyone apprised of developments.

I include this data following my remarks:

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, WAGE AND HOUR AND PUBLIC CONTRACTS DIVISIONS,

Washington, D.C., June 28, 1965.

HON. JAMES ROOSEVELT,
General Subcommittee on Labor, Committee on Education and Labor, U.S. House of Representatives, Washington, D.C.

DEAR CONGRESSMAN ROOSEVELT: This completes our response to the economic questions raised when Secretary of Labor Wirtz appeared May 25 and 26 before the subcommittee to testify in support of H.R. 8259 and related bills.

The transmission includes answers raised with respect to the following:

1. Extent of overtime work in major manufacturing industry groups and in wholesale trade lines—particularly by low-wage employees.
2. Plant expansion due to double time.
3. Extent of overtime in industries proposed for coverage under H.R. 8259.
4. Repeal of section 13(a) (15) exemption for logging employees.
5. Resort hotels—indications of a recent trend to extending periods of operation.
6. Business failures—recent trends.
7. Tabulation showing employees not now protected by FLSA and the number who would be brought under the minimum wage after enactment of H.R. 8259.
8. Full-time student regulations (sec. 14), statement re age limitation.
9. Management trainees—comments on language in H.R. 11838 (88th Cong.).
10. Profits in laundry and drycleaning plants.

Wage relationship between employees working more than 40 hours a week and those working fewer hours, manufacturing industry groups and wholesale lines, United States, March 1964

	Percent of non-supervisory employees who worked overtime	Percent of nonsupervisory employees earning specified amounts of pay who worked overtime			Average hourly earnings of overtime workers as a percent of average hourly earnings of employees working 40 hours or less
		Less than \$1.30	Less than \$2	\$3 or more	
Manufacturing industry groups:					
Food and kindred products.....	30	10	44	13	96.9
Tobacco manufactures.....	18	11	64	5	89.5
Textile mill products.....	38	5	82	(1)	103.0
Apparel and related products.....	18	19	76	6	100.0
Lumber and wood products.....	36	18	59	6	97.4
Furniture and fixtures.....	38	12	75	(1)	87.9
Paper and allied products.....	41	(1)	20	12	105.8
Printing, publishing, and allied industries.....	21	6	35	34	98.9
Leather and leather products.....	25	13	70	(1)	102.3
Stone, clay, and glass products.....	33	7	37	12	95.3
Fabricated metal products.....	33	(1)	40	15	95.0
Machinery, except electrical.....	35	(1)	21	25	99.6
Professional instruments.....	26	(1)	22	26	105.9
Miscellaneous manufacturing industries.....	26	6	51	9	105.5
Wholesale trade lines:					
Drugs and chemicals.....	31	6	49	6	93.5
Dry goods and apparel.....	16	11	64	4	84.6
Groceries and related products.....	42	21	57	7	91.5
Farm products—raw materials.....	34	28	82	2	86.7
Hardware, plumbing, and heating.....	35	8	53	10	95.0
Machinery, equipment, and supplies.....	27	7	38	21	94.7
Miscellaneous wholesalers.....	32	13	53	13	89.6

1 Less than 5 percent.

NOTE.—Data are shown separately for each group for which they are available.

2. PLANT EXPANSION DUE TO DOUBLE TIME

There have been no studies which indicate the extent to which a double-time requirement would necessitate expansion of plant facilities. Some witnesses who testified last

11. Handicapped worker certificates for the aged.

12. Retail workers under union contracts.

Some questions raised at the hearings with respect to certain legislative matters are still being reviewed.

Sincerely yours,

CLARENCE T. LUNDQUIST,
Administrator.

1. EXTENT OF OVERTIME WORK IN MAJOR MANUFACTURING INDUSTRY GROUPS, AND IN WHOLESALE TRADE LINES—PARTICULARLY BY LOW-WAGE EMPLOYEES

Reports on the March 1964 nationwide surveys of manufacturing and wholesale trade have been transmitted to the Congress. These reports show not only the extent to which hours over 40 per week are prevalent but also the extent to which overtime is worked by employees at the lower end of the wage scale.

In the attached table we have listed for each major manufacturing and wholesale trade industry group for which separate data are available the percent of all nonsupervisory employees in the group who worked over 40 hours a week as well as corresponding percents for workers who earned (a) less than \$1.30 an hour, (b) less than \$2 an hour, and (c) \$3 or more an hour. In addition, we have computed average hourly earnings for employees working over 40 hours a week as a percent of average hourly earnings of workers working 40 hours or less.

The data indicate that average straight time hourly earnings for workers working overtime were lower than for those who worked no overtime in 8 of the 14 manufacturing groups and in each of the 7 wholesale trade lines.

Furthermore, the table shows that in 11 of the 14 manufacturing groups and in each of the 7 wholesale lines a significantly greater proportion of workers who earned \$2 or less an hour worked overtime than was true for workers earning \$3 or more an hour.

year on the double time for overtime proposal indicated that plant capacity is a limiting factor in the hiring of employees.

It should be noted, however, that most industries are not operating at full capacity

It is my firm belief that we must act with determination to preserve the essential elements of our national heritage. We have become a nation that contents itself with memorializing men and events in stone and inscription. I feel that it is time that we turn to more lasting memorials, to the country that has made our people great. It is necessary for us to act now to preserve these unspoiled stretches of natural beauty.

Therefore, I ask unanimous consent that Mr. Shannon's article be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[From the New York (N.Y.) Times, June 28, 1965]

THE CHOICE FOR THE NATION'S SEASHORE (By William V. Shannon)

A broad strip of white sand, the ocean breaking upon the shore in bright, sparkling waves, the whole sweep of sand, sea, and sky just as thousands of years of nature have produced it—a pure and complete masterpiece.

Scenes such as this pose a choice to their human visitors and nominal owners. Some men see them as a trust to be preserved now and forever undefiled for future generations to admire. They rejoice that there is no structure here taller than the craggy dune, no residents except the birds, wheeling and soaring, no sound louder than the beating of the waves and the low moan of the lone sea wind.

WHY NOT A HIGHWAY

Other men look upon scenes such as this and see a perfect route for a six-lane highway. They readily calculate how many house lots they can sell once the bulldozers have leveled those useless dunes. In their mind's eye, a luxury motel already stands upon that lonely promontory. A profitable row of hot-dog stands, pizza palaces and cozy snack bars, each carefully identified with its own neon sign, already rises behind the highway. Where those gulls now nest, a quite sizable shopping center could be built. In short, there is almost no limit to what could be done with it—or to—these seashores once they are developed.

On every seacoast of the United States, men have been making their fateful choice. There are about 3,700 miles of shoreline, for example, along the Atlantic and gulf coasts from Maine to Texas. As late as 1935—only 30 years ago—the National Park Service surveyed that shoreline and found immense stretches of unspoiled beach. It recommended that 12 major strips, containing 437 miles of beach, be preserved as national seashores. But Congress failed to act. Only 1 of the 12 was saved for the public. Another survey 10 years ago reported: "All the others, save one, have long since gone into private and commercial developments."

Two evils occur when commercial development wins out. First, it is unjust that millions of people be barred from recreation on the beach by "Private Property" and "No Trespassing" signs. Access to the seashore should be guarded as a precious public right. Secondly, private development means unbalanced development. It usually destroys the grass and other vegetation that are nature's way of protecting the beach itself against erosion.

Private cottages line every foot of the shoreline, depriving the visitor of any chance to "get away from it all" or to see the shore in its natural state. Seepage from septic tanks pollutes the water, ruining the feeding grounds of the birds and killing the shellfish. A national seashore, by contrast, can provide a sensible balance of intensive de-

velopment for recreation and protection of nature.

ROADBUILDERS BEATEN

In the past decade, people have become much more aware of what is involved in the policy choice for the Nation's seashore. The heedless roadbuilders were defeated and a Fire Island National Seashore was created. What could be salvaged on heavily developed Cape Cod was permanently protected by a national seashore there. So was Padre Island off Texas.

But the pressures are intense and the commercial developers often win. Such was the choice made for Marco Island, the largest of the once wild and virtually uninhabited islands off the southwest coast of Florida. Graced with a magnificent crescent beach of hard white sand, winding little creeks, fantastically shaped hills of sand and many snowy egrets and other uncommon birds, Marco Island was once considered by the National Park Service for designation as a national seashore.

It would have been a priceless national asset, but Senator HOLLAND of Florida exercised his considerable influence in behalf of private owners—and so the hard reality of private profit prevailed over the public interest. Now the glossy advertisements beckon buyers to the usual seaside cottages.

A similar choice presently exists for Assateague Island off Maryland. Although the island is a barrier reef, part of which is under water during heavy storms, 3,000 persons bought house lots on the dunes. Over their vehement objections, the Senate Interior Committee has approved a bill to make Assateague a national seashore. Unfortunately, the committee bowed to the insistence of Virginia's Senator ROBERTSON and added a requirement that a through highway be built from the bridge at the Maryland end to the bridge at the Virginia end, thus turning this narrow island into a traffic loop and violating the heart of the Chincoteague National Wildlife Refuge.

The choice to be made on this bill is clear. Indeed, what is also clear is that if Congress and the American people do not make the right choice at Assateague and elsewhere in protecting the Nation's vanishing seashore, there will soon be no choice left to make. Too many men have too often chosen to develop primitive beauty into extinction. Nature affords few remaining opportunities in the continental United States to see the masterworks of its daughter, the sea undefiled.

ROTTEN BOROUGH AMENDMENTS SEEK PROTECTION OF MINORITY INTERESTS THROUGH STALE- MATED GOVERNMENT

Mr. DOUGLAS. Mr. President, an excellent statement in opposition to the anti reapportionment amendments has been submitted to the House Judiciary Committee by Dean Joseph O'Meara and Prof. Thomas Broden, Jr., of the Notre Dame Law School.

Their statement makes an important contribution to the debate on these amendments, because it points out that the real purpose of the amendments is to protect a minority interest, through stalemated government in the States. This is an accurate and revealing description of the effect of these amendments, should one of them be proposed, ratified, and implemented.

I ask unanimous consent that the statement be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the statement was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

STATEMENT BY DEAN JOSEPH O'MEARA AND THOMAS BRODEN, JR., OF THE NOTRE DAME LAW SCHOOL, PRESENTED BEFORE THE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ON HOUSE JOINT RESOLUTION 2, A PROPOSAL TO OVERRULE THE LATEST SUPREME COURT REAPPORTIONMENT RULINGS

Mr. Chairman and members of the House Judiciary Committee, my name is Thomas Broden, Jr. I am a member of the bar of the State of Indiana and am professor of law in the Notre Dame Law School. This statement represents the views of Dean Joseph O'Meara of the Notre Dame Law School as well as my own views. I appreciate the opportunity you have afforded me to present views on one of the most significant legal and political issues our Nation has faced, legislative reapportionment.

It is paradoxical that those who have most strenuously deplored the plight of State and local government should now be attacking what Roscoe Drummond calls the single most important States-rights measure in the 20th century. The decline and fall of State and local government in this century is a national calamity. As Drummond says, until the Supreme Court of the United States provided a judicial remedy, the situation seemed hopeless. The Supreme Court decisions, requiring fair legislative apportionment, cut through the Gordian knot, cut through the death grip that a rotten-borough system had on effective, responsible action and thus have made possible rejuvenated, revitalized State government.

What caused the decline of State and local government? The needs and desires of a majority of the people have been disregarded by State legislatures. This has happened because representation in State legislatures has not reflected the urban and suburban population shift (often in defiance of constitutional reapportionment mandates) thus giving to rural or small-town legislators power to stalemate efforts to respond to the peoples' needs. Stalemate destroyed the effectiveness of many State governments.

Anti-Court proposals to overrule *Reynolds v. Sims*, 84 S. Ct. 1362 (1964) requiring both houses of State legislatures to be apportioned on a population basis, would return us to the era of stalemate. Control of one house only is sufficient to block legislative action. The adoption of these proposals would be to condemn State government forever to the grave of inaction. No one interested in good State government can take comfort in these proposals. They will benefit only those who are interested in weak and ineffective government and the consequent aggrandizement of national power. They will benefit only those who are powerful, wealthy, and unconcerned, who did well under and therefore were satisfied with the situation existing before *Reynolds v. Sims*.

All kinds of fancy theoretical reasons have been put forward to defend this last-ditch effort to hang onto political domination by a minority. For example, it is suggested that nonpopulation factors must be taken into account in apportioning at least one house of a State legislature so that adequate protection may be given to certain special interests, such as rural interests, or property interests, or interests of persons on one side of the Rocky Mountains, or interests of one group of water users, or conservationists, or industrialists, or fishermen, or citrus growers, or Spanish-speaking persons, and so on. And there is no good reason why these interests should be singled out for protection instead of others such as the interests of religious groups, or racial groups, or ethnic groups, or labor, schools, and so on. But that's the rub. To try to protect all interests is the aim of proportional representation, an approach which sounds fine in theory but is disastrous in practice. What

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happens practically is stalemate: to protect certain special interests, the interests of all others are sacrificed. The basic assumption of our democratic system is that through equal representation the interests of all will be as fairly protected as is humanly possible. No one has yet been able to demonstrate that it is more important to protect the interests of a minority, by stalemate, than to promote the interests of all or as near thereto as is humanly possible.

The anti-Court forces feel their strongest argument is the Federal analogy. That is, that only one house of the Federal Congress is apportioned on a population basis; and that the precedent of the Senate, based as it is on other factors, justifies the States in so organizing their legislatures. But this is a totally unwarranted distortion of the Federal analogy. The system of representation in the two Houses of the Federal Congress * * * is one conceived out of compromise and concession indispensable to the establishment of our Federal republic. So said the Court in *Reynolds v. Sims*, but in saying so the Court merely recognized the significance, not of special interests, but of the States as independent governmental institutions.

So much of the Federal analogy as is valid the Court has clearly accepted for it has said that "as long as the basic standard of equality of population" is maintained, States may give some independent representation to political subdivisions to assure them some voice (84 S.Ct. 1362, 1391).

We agree with the Court in *Reynolds v. Sims* that: "Attempted reliance on the Federal analogy appears often to be little more than an after-the-fact rationalization offered in defense of maladjusted State apportionment arrangements. The original constitutions of 36 of our States provided that representation in both houses of the State legislatures would be based completely, or predominantly, on population. And the Founding Fathers clearly had on intention of establishing a pattern or model for the apportionment of seats in State legislatures when the system of representation in the Federal Congress was adopted. Demonstrative of this is the fact that the Northwest Ordinance, adopted in the same year, 1787, as the Federal Constitution, provided for the apportionment of seats in territorial legislatures solely on the basis of population."

Reynolds v. Sims, far from being an attack on effective State government, is the key to such effectiveness. Friends of State's rights should be defending, not seeking to overrule it.

This is a time for decision for the States rights people. If they are for weak local governments they cannot be against swollen national power, because that goes right along with weakness at the local level. So they could just as well be called big Government people. In short, it is time for these so-called States righters to fish or cut bait.

THE OBJECT IN VIETNAM

Mr. RUSSELL of South Carolina. Mr. President, while brave American patriots struggle in Vietnam, in the cause of freedom, much discussion about our policy there goes on at home. The President, in my opinion, has adopted a courageous course, one worthy of our support.

I ask consent to have printed in the Record an editorial which was published recently in a fine newspaper in the capital city of South Carolina, the Columbia State. The editorial states, correctly, that far more than one small, beleaguered country is at stake in our struggle

in Vietnam. I commend the editorial to the Members of the Senate.

There being no objection, the editorial was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

[From the Columbia (S.C.) State, June 11, 1965]

THE OBJECT IN VIETNAM

Misgivings among Americans over the long and extremely difficult siege in Vietnam are understandable but fail to take into account the full meaning of our persistence there.

But for this show of the resolve of the United States to hold back the wave of Communist aggression, other sectors of the world would long since have fallen into the grip of Moscow or Peiping.

As Secretary Rusk reminded this week, these further advances of the Communists would have been achieved by aggression of one form or another. They would not have been initiated by the peoples involved. He mentioned West Berlin and Iran as victims had the example of armed force in Vietnam not been provided.

The action of the United States in southeast Asia is a costly and complex one indeed. The situation defies standard military procedures. It is conceded that military action alone probably won't bring a favorable result. The task is one carrying little encouragement. It is likely to go on and on.

Yet the resistance we offer there to aggression has effect far beyond the frustrating jungles of South Vietnam; it says to the Communists that other such intrusions would find the United States moving against them.

In Vietnam more is at stake than that beleaguered little country.

EFFECT OF CHANGES IN LEAD AND ZINC IMPORT QUOTA SYSTEM

Mr. ANDERSON. Mr. President, on June 23, 1964, the U.S. Tariff Commission convened a public hearing, as part of a study, requested by the President, to determine the probable economic effect on the lead-zinc industry through reduction or termination of the present import quota system, established on October 1, 1958.

At that hearing, I presented a personal statement, based on my experience with this industry in my own State, and also representing literally years of personal effort and the efforts of my colleagues in the Senate to establish a long-range lead-zinc minerals policy. It was my desire to help answer the question asked of the Tariff Commission by the President.

My reaction to his request, particularly considering the history of the lead-zinc industry efforts, was that we should not only look at the current statistics on production and consumption, but also should try to plan for the next decade, based on experience gained during the past 10 to 15 years.

My statement of June 1964 referred to the fact that the economy of the industry had improved with increasing metal consumption; and today I am happy to report that this trend has continued; but at that time I also stated that the entire lead-zinc industry had not been relieved of the injury which was the reason for the imposition of quotas in 1958. During the past year, more mines have reopened; but I must report that there still remains a serious question as to just how long the current

prosperous period for our domestic lead-zinc mining industry can continue. As a result, some mining companies are hesitant to commit the large expenditures necessary in order to bring new mines into production—so long as the industry has no assurance of some logical import limitations that will modify the disastrous business cycles which have been characteristic of our natural-resource industries, and which in the case of lead and zinc have been caused by extensive and unnecessary imports during periods of reduced metal consumption.

During the Tariff Commission hearing, we acknowledged that the present quotas have mechanical problems; but we emphasized the fact that the industry itself had proposed and supported a system of flexible lead-zinc quotas which would provide equitable treatment for the producers, the consumers, and the importers. I urged the Tariff Commission to study this plan; and it was, and is, my recommendation that this flexible quota plan be enacted before any change in the present quota system is made.

The Tariff Commission issued its report on this study on June 8, 1965. It is quite a document; and all the discussion, all the statistical information, and their advice to the President, in answer to his question, are summarized in one short, but significant, sentence:

Termination of quotas would not likely have a detrimental effect on domestic lead and zinc producers unless world demand for these metals should subside substantially in relation to world supplies.

This sounds like a rather simple, straightforward sentence; but I call attention to one extremely important and significant word—"unless." This word summarizes the reasoning of my presentation last year to the Tariff Commission. It combines a basic premise that under present conditions, in the opinion of the Tariff Commission, quotas could be removed without injury to the industry; but the Commission acknowledges that any future imbalance of world metal supply, in relation to consumption, will very likely once again damage our domestic industry; and the closing statement of the report says just this. In other words the Tariff Commission has looked into the future. It has noted the announced expansion of lead and zinc mine and smelter capacity all around the world. It realizes that any drop in world consumption will send the surplus to the United States, unless we have in effect a plan to accommodate the imports needed in order to supplement domestic production.

There are within the executive branch committees, which are studying this report, to advise the President as to whether action regarding the quota system is warranted at the present time. I believe that the opinions of those within the industry itself should be given special consideration, as they are naturally most familiar with the many factors that can affect the economies here and worldwide.

My friends in the industry have advised me that, based on the Tariff Com-

in making our State of Oregon a little better place in which to live.

Ever since I was a little boy I have received some of my best educational lessons at fairs. I would not wish to miss participating in them any year, subject to my duties in the Senate. Senators may be sure that I shall try to show my Devon cattle again this year at our Oregon State Centennial Fair as well as the Multnomah County Fair at Gresham, the Lane County Fair, the Hermiston Fair, and the Pacific International Livestock Show.

Our Oregon State Fair is recognized as one of the three or four best State fairs in the Nation. If a livestock breeder wins top honors at our Oregon State Fair or at the Pacific International Livestock Show, he is really in the economic purple when it comes to sales. For many years, I was on the board of directors of the Oregon State Fair Horse Show. We made the very wise decision many years ago to combine the horse show with a rodeo, and each year this combined horse show and rodeo performance sets a high standard throughout the West. Whenever I attend meetings of horsemen and cattlemen throughout the country, I almost invariably listen to praises about the Oregon State Fair Horse Show and Rodeo events.

The Oregon State Fair is under the able management of Mr. Howard Maple. He has made a fine record for our State fair, and I am pleased to congratulate him.

Oregon supporters of the Oregon State Fair have sent to me a resolution, to be entered in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, calling attention to this year's Oregon Centennial State Fair. It reads as follows:

Let it be known that the year 1965 is the centennial year for the Oregon State Fair, to be celebrated in that State's capital city of Salem.

And since this is the 100th anniversary of one of Oregon's most colorful festivals, let it be known as one of the the greatest State fairs ever to be held in the State's 106-year history.

Since its beginning in 1861, and throughout its long history when the great Lewis and Clark Exposition took its place and the 3 years during World War II when it was discontinued, the Oregon State Fair has been a statewide event.

In this year of 1965, throughout the great State of Oregon, the Oregon State Fair Centennial will be celebrated by the people of Oregon. It will be one of the largest single attractions to be held in the State this year and during its 9-day celebration, it will be first and foremost in the hearts of all Oregonians.

I am pleased to call attention to the coming centennial State fair event in my State, and I am proud to extend, through the pages of the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, by spreading this resolution in the RECORD, a warm and cordial invitation not only to Members of Congress, but also to lovers of fairs throughout the Nation to visit Oregon this year at the time our centennial State fair is being held.

WHY WE ARE FIGHTING IN VIETNAM

Mr. MURPHY. Mr. President, there is a great deal of discussion about the U.S. effort in Vietnam. Mr. Gary Ledwidge, who is stationed in Vietnam, quotes from an article in the Army Times. Since the article may provide a better understanding of why we are really fighting in Vietnam.

I ask unanimous consent that the letter be printed in full in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the letter was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

APO, SAN FRANCISCO, CALIF.,
April 24, 1965.

HON. GEORGE MURPHY,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, D.C.

MY DEAR SENATOR MURPHY: There seems to be a great deal of dissension running rampant in Congress these days with regard to our Nation's stand in Vietnam. Although it is natural and certainly in the American tradition for each individual to have his own opinion, I believe there are many who have lost sight of the real obligations we must fulfill. Not those to Vietnam or any other nation, but those to the United States and the American people.

Since I am not an accomplished orator, and often find it extremely difficult to express my thoughts and feelings in either the written or the spoken word, I have taken the liberty to quote an article from an old issue of the Army Times (the author of which is unknown to me), which I believe should give our representatives some idea of the real meaning of our interest in Asia:

"I'm here because the America I represent has taken a stand here. But that isn't all of it; that isn't reason enough.

"Here in South Vietnam there's battle in progress—one more battle in the world's longest war. This war began a long time ago, when Marx and Lenin lost contact with reality. This battle here is the current effort of men who love freedom to put the train of humanity upright on the track again. I love freedom and I'm here to help preserve it. But that's not my only reason.

"My role as an adviser here requires that I interpret the technology of my experience for the understanding of those with whom I work; it asks that I show and tell these people here a portion of what the mind of Western man has conceived for himself, and for all others who may wish to learn. I come here not really knowing these people, but wanting to know them. I have come then as a teacher who wishes to learn. But I have other reasons.

"I think that man will best be able to realize himself, to pursue and gain happiness, in an atmosphere of give and take where how much he gives in effort determines how much he takes in gain. This environment, I believe, is characterized economically by capitalism, and nurtured politically by democracy. I'm here then as a proponent of democratic capitalism.

"I don't have to agree with all her officials to be in agreement with the stand my country has taken here. I don't have to be a member of the Democratic Party to endorse the party of the President and his Cabinet with regard to Vietnam. Nor must I be a Republican to wonder why wheat was sold to Russia. I don't have to dislike a southern filibuster in Congress on civil rights; I don't have to bow low to credos I deeply despise, and I don't have to guard my home at night.

"I don't have to do those things because, by the fortunate accident of birth in time and place, I am an American. For my reasons, I have the choice from the things that America means to me. I can and do exercise that choice, and it is that which I most admire in America that I am here to preserve and protect.

"I am here so that when America wonders why she prevailed, it will be found that I—because I loved her—was a reason. But even these are not all my reasons.

"Because I love, and because I am loved, I know what love is. I can say knowingly that I value the people I love, the things I love, and the ideas I believe in. The value of these things to me is worth whatever price I pay. The highest price I can pay is that of my life. I have brought that life here—with all its meaning to me as an American and as a man—but I have not come here despairingly; I have not come here to lose my life. To risk it, yes; because the values it has given me are worth that risk.

"So I have come to this battle to save my life. And that is reason enough."

This, I believe, sums up the feelings of a great many members of the Armed Forces, even those of us who are not at this time actively engaged in this battle.

I truly wish that I could have expressed myself in such a manner.

To fight in defense of one's country in time of war must be horrifying; but to fight and suffer and die during a time of "peace"—this is truly a sacrifice.

To those who have fought and died, to those who now carry the burden of this battle, we owe not only our physical and material support, but far more important—we owe them our moral and spiritual support. Were it not for men such as these—men who are willing to pay the highest price for freedom, we, as a nation, as a people, should not prevail.

In the event that this article has not come to the attention of the Members of the Senate, I feel that much could be gained by bringing it before them. I have also asked Representative AL BELL to read or distribute it to the Members of the House.

I sincerely believe that this is a worthwhile subject, and that it will provide a better understanding, for those who need it, of what we are really fighting to protect in Vietnam.

With my warmest personal regards and best wishes for your future success and happiness, I remain,

Very truly yours,

G. M. LEDWIDGE,
Seventh Aviation Battalion.

NEW JERSEY CITIZENS COMMITTEE FOR HIGHER EDUCATION

Mr. WILLIAMS of New Jersey. Mr. President—

When industry is seeking a location, the education environment of the area always looms high as a factor to consider.

That quotation, by Elmer W. Engstrom, president of the Radio Corp. of America, and vice chairman of the newly formed Citizens Committee for Higher Education in New Jersey, aptly states the need for continued diligence on our part to the challenge of educating our young people.

The citizens committee was formed to examine the increasing educational needs of the State of New Jersey. I am sure that the findings of the committee will be of interest to all the Members of

this body, because the educational demands of our society are common to each of our 50 States.

The preliminary findings of the committee show that an estimated 48,000 New Jersey high school graduates will be seeking to enter college in 1970. The cost of providing adequate facilities for these students will be \$250 million, of which \$40.1 million has been produced by a bond issue. These statistics may seem sterile; but we must translate them into their meaning to our own sons and daughters who will be entering college during this period.

Therefore, I ask unanimous consent that an article from the June 17 edition of the Newark Evening News be printed at this point in the Record.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

NEEDS OF COLLEGES SEEN \$210 MILLION

(By Robert F. Palmer)

Expansion of New Jersey's public college facilities to meet enrollment increases by 1970 will require a capital investment of \$210 million, twice as great as that previously estimated, according to the newly formed Citizens Committee for Higher Education.

The new estimate of construction needs was put forth at a meeting of committee leaders yesterday at the Essex Club to announce formation of the group and to describe its campaign to arouse public support for college expansion.

Henry Chauncey, president of Educational Testing Service, who is serving as secretary of the committee, said that a new study made especially for the committee had produced the \$210 million figure. The previous estimate of \$95 million in unmet needs had been based on the Strayer report of 1961.

Both Chauncey and Dr. Robert F. Goheen, president of Princeton University and chairman of the committee, declared that the Strayer report was badly out of date.

CALLED FOR \$135 MILLION

The Strayer study found that \$135 million would be required to expand New Jersey's publicly supported higher education institutions—Rutgers University, the six State colleges and Newark College of Engineering—between 1964 and 1970. Since then, the 1964 college bond issue raised \$40.1 million, leaving \$95 million to be raised under the Strayer calculations.

Chauncey emphasized that the new estimate of \$210 million in capital funds was in addition to the \$40.1 million produced by the bond issue. He said that of the \$210 million, some \$90 million would come from revenue bonds for dining halls and dormitories which would be entirely self-liquidating.

A major reason for the estimate increase, Chauncey said, was a finding that the Strayer Report had underestimated the number of students who would be seeking college admission in 1970. He said the committee study had found there will be approximately 48,000 New Jersey high school graduates wanting to enter college in 1970, compared with the Strayer estimate of 40,000.

COSTS TO SOAR

Chauncey declared that the expansion of facilities as suggested by the study would require a 50 percent increase in operating expenses by 1970.

He declined to elaborate on the study, saying merely that it had been made to give the committee a general idea of the needs. He and Dr. Goheen said the committee plans to initiate a more thorough study, with the cooperation of the State board of education

and the State department of education, to determine the precise needs to be met.

The study to be undertaken, Dr. Goheen said, will form the basis for the committee's "case" for expansion of public higher education that will be used "to lift the sights of the public and the legislature to the tremendous magnitude of the problem and the need for action."

Dr. Goheen said the committee, composed of about 75 leaders of industrial, commercial, and educational enterprises, would aim to point up the amount of funds needed and "leave it to the legislature" to determine how to raise it.

He said that the committee—at least as far as the 11 founding members are concerned—would favor enactment of a new broad-base tax, but would refrain from taking any position on a particular type of tax.

"In New Jersey," Dr. Goheen said, "there has been a deep-rooted antagonism of a broad-base tax Happily, we're now in the position of having two gubernatorial candidates who favor a broad-base tax. So, the situation looks much more promising."

He said he felt confident that as a result of the committee's campaign "the people of New Jersey will see the need and will be willing to put up the money." He said the campaign would be "relatively quiet" until after the November elections.

The vice chairmen of the committee, Elmer W. Engstrom, president of Radio Corp. of America, and James Hayward, president of Atlantic City Electric Co., said that improvement of New Jersey's higher education program was necessary to attract new industry to the State.

"When industry is seeking a location, the education environment of the area always looms high as a factor to consider," Engstrom said.

"A number of industries have rejected New Jersey because of its inadequate educational facilities," Hayward declared.

FE CHAD Proxmire "VIETNAM DIALOG: MR. BUNDY AND THE PROFESSORS"

Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. President, on Monday night, June 21, six distinguished and highly qualified American experts debated our Vietnam policy on national television.

Literally millions of Americans watched this debate. It has been widely discussed. It served an immensely enlightening purpose. But unfortunately it suffered the weakness of all television broadcasts—its perishability. There is no publicly available written record.

For this reason, Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that a transcript of this debate be printed at this point in the Record.

There being no objection, the transcript was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

CBS News SPECIAL REPORT: "VIETNAM DIALOG: MR. BUNDY AND THE PROFESSORS," JUNE 21, 1965

(Participants: McGeorge Bundy; Profs. Hans J. Morgenthau, Zbigniew K. Brzezinski, and Edmund O. Clubb; Dr. Guy J. Pauker; Prof. John D. Donoghue.)
(Moderator, Eric Sevareid; producer, William Small.)

ANNOUNCER. This is the CBS News special report; live, from the Hall of Nations, Georgetown University, Washington, D.C., "Vietnam Dialog: Mr. Bundy and the Professors."

Here to moderate this 1-hour discussion is CBS News national correspondent, Eric Sevareid.

Mr. SEVAREID. Good evening, and welcome

to the audience in this hall, and to the audience in their homes. The next hour is an important one, we think, in the history of television, and quite possibly an important one in the current history of this country.

On the other side of the world the United States is at war. However you title or define it, it is war. Vietnam has cost America somewhat around a billion and a half dollars so far, and several hundred lives.

There is every prospect that these harsh statistics will climb as this war wears on.

There is some risk at least of a greater war, possibly involving other powers. But the costs and risks of fighting this war have to be measured against the risks and the costs of not fighting it.

So informed and responsible men have differed. The spirit of the opposition to our course in Vietnam was fashioned in the colleges of this country. It took the form of an organization now called the Interuniversity Committee for Debate on Foreign Policy.

Their protest was expressed in a series of teach-ins around the country this spring. These culminated in a big gathering here in Washington on May 15. The Government official who the protesters most wanted to hear and to question was Mr. McGeorge Bundy, Special Assistant to President Johnson for National Security Affairs. Mr. Bundy was then unable to appear. The President had sent him to Santo Domingo. But he is here tonight.

So this hour, then, is a kind of condensed reprise of that teach-in and confrontation.

Mr. Bundy and the two men on his side of this argument tonight are not strangers to the academic world. Nor are the three professors on the other side of the argument strangers to the world of government.

To identify these six men, their faces, their voices, and their points of view, let me introduce them one at a time, and in so doing ask each one to state in just a sentence or two his general position on the Vietnam policy of the American Government.

First, Mr. McGeorge Bundy, former dean of the Harvard faculty of arts and sciences, and Special Assistant to President Kennedy, and now to President Johnson.

Mr. Bundy.

Mr. BUNDY. Well, I am here partly because I failed to keep an earlier engagement, partly because I deeply believe in the process of fair and open discussion. Most of all because I believe with all my heart that the policy which the United States is now following is the best policy in a difficult and dangerous situation and the one which best serves our interests and the interests of the world, the interest of peace.

Mr. SEVAREID. Mr. Edmund O. Clubb, chairman of the Columbia University Seminar on Modern Asia, veteran of a quarter century in the Foreign Service, with many years as a diplomat in Asia.

Mr. Clubb.

Mr. CLUBB. Thank you, Mr. Sevareid.

My position is simple. I hold that, first, the American military intervention in Vietnam is in violation of our legal treaty commitments; second, that we cannot win militarily in Vietnam without virtually annihilating the Vietnamese people, which is no victory; and third and finally, that our present policy and actions are alienating both Asian and other world sympathy from us, and thus seriously weakening our global political position.

Mr. SEVAREID. Mr. Zbigniew K. Brzezinski, professor of government at Columbia, and director of the Research Institute on Communist Affairs.

Mr. Brzezinski.

Mr. BRZEZINSKI. I believe, Mr. Sevareid, that the Vietnamese issue is not just a local issue. It involves, first of all, an effort by China to impose its supremacy in the Asian

region, contrary to our interests, and to that of some of China's Asian neighbors, and more importantly involves a global issue; namely, what sort of strategy the international Communist movement would pursue in our age and who will lead it.

Mr. SEVAREID. Hans J. Morgenthau, professor of political science of the University of Chicago and director of the University Center for the Study of American Foreign and Military Policy.

Mr. MORGENTHAU. I am opposed to our present policy in Vietnam on moral, military, political, and general intellectual grounds. I am convinced that this policy cannot achieve the desired results and that quite to the contrary it will create problems much more serious than those which we have faced in the recent past.

Mr. SEVAREID. Mr. Guy J. Pauker, former teacher at Harvard, at MIT, at the University of California, now head of the Asia Section of the Social Science Department of the Rand Corp.

Mr. PAUKER. I am here, Mr. Severeid, because the discussion of Vietnam has generated so much emotion on the campuses of American universities that the factual base of this discussion is frequently ignored.

I think that one should bring the facts back into the discussion.

Mr. SEVAREID. And finally, to John D. Donoghue, associate professor of anthropology, Michigan State University, former research professor in Japan and adviser on administration in Saigon and I believe in various villages of Vietnam.

Mr. DONOGHUE. Two years experience in Vietnam, much of this time spent in villages, have made one thing clear to me. Those who make American policy do not understand and, therefore, are unable to cope constructively with the human discontent that produces revolutionary movement in developing countries.

We must reaffirm the revolutionary dedication to freedom that gave birth to this Nation.

Mr. SEVAREID. Well, gentlemen, and members of this audience we thought we would try to divide this discussion to follow into four rather large encompassing questions or aspects of the whole Vietnam problem. And the first question is, "Why—what are the legal and moral and political reasons or justifications for the American presence in Vietnam—why are we there?"

Let's begin with Mr. Bundy.

Mr. BUNDY. Well, Mr. Severeid, I think the best way, the shortest and the most accurate way for me to state the reasons for our presence in Vietnam is to take just a moment to read from the President's speech of April 7, at Johns Hopkins in Baltimore, because there is no more authoritative statement of our position.

"We are there," he said, "because we have a promise to keep. Since 1954 every American President has offered support to the people of South Vietnam. We have helped to build and we have helped to defend. Thus over many years we have made a national pledge to help South Vietnam defend its independence. To dishonor that pledge, to abandon this small and brave nation to its enemy and to the terror that must follow would be an unforgivable wrong." So the first point is that we have a commitment, matured through time, made for good reasons, and sustained for the same reasons.

We are also there, the President went on, "to strengthen world order. Around the globe, from Berlin to Thailand, are people whose well-being rests in part on the belief they can count on us if they are attacked. To leave Vietnam to its fate would shake the confidence of all these people in the value of American commitment. The result would be increased unrest and instability or even war."

And the President went on to set the stakes in terms of the problem in Asia itself.

"We are also there," he said, "because there are great stakes in the balance. Let no one think that retreat from Vietnam would bring an end to conflict. The battle would be renewed in one country and then another. The central lesson of our time is that the appetite of aggression is never satisfied. To withdraw from one battlefield means only to prepare for the next."

"Our objective," he said—and this is perhaps in the end the defining point immediately of the contest—"our objective is the independence of South Vietnam and its freedom from attack. We want nothing for ourselves—only that the people of South Vietnam be allowed to guide their own country in their own way."

Mr. SEVAREID. I am going to ask the other side now for an opening statement on this part of the question, from Mr. Clubb. And then we will go to, I hope, general discussion of it.

Mr. Clubb.

Mr. CLUBB. Mr. Bundy, of course, presented a principal argument that is offered—namely, that in Vietnam the United States is following a policy laid down in 1954. This by itself is inadequate warrant. Lord Salisbury has said that one of the commonest forms of error in politics is the sticking to the carcass of dead policies. The U.S. Government has not been unguilty of that particular error.

The 1954 Dulles proposals for the containment of Asian communism by massive retaliation and brinkmanship had adverse effects at the time for the global American political position.

The present strategy, be it noted, differs somewhat from the Dulles doctrine. First, the military retaliation at the present time is measured. But there is another divergence. Second, in the 1950's, Gen. Douglas MacArthur and President Eisenhower both warned against our fighting a land war in Asia. But Washington now indicates that it is possibly headed in that direction.

There is a correlary argument that is offered—it is said that we are in South Vietnam in any event in service of solemn treaty engagements. The 1954 SEATO Treaty extended a defensive umbrella over South Vietnam. And it is said the Saigon Government, or perhaps I had better say a Saigon Government, has asked for our help.

A State Department legal adviser said recently that criticism charging that the United States had violated the Organization of American States Charter reflected a fundamentalist point of view with regard to international law.

Well, I am a fundamentalist. I believe that treaties mean what they say. And I believe that treaty signatories are bound by their provisions. And I refer to three treaties in this general connection.

One, the United States helped to create the Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928, designed to outlaw war forever. And the United States by that treaty renounced war as an instrument of national policy.

Second, the United Nations Charter commits the United States, among other signatories, to settle its international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security and justice are not endangered.

Third, the SEATO Treaty itself. The United States bound itself by the treaty provision to consult with its treaty allies regarding an aggressor's armed attack or any situation which might endanger peace of the treaty area in order to agree on the measures to be taken for the common defense.

SEATO decisions authorizing our military actions do not appear on the public record. Without formal authorization of the SEATO organization, we are not entitled to rely on the SEATO Treaty for our legal sanction.

Mr. SEVAREID. Mr. Clubb, if you go much further on this, I think you are going to absorb nearly all the time left for this section of this debate. And I would like, if you will excuse me, to break in at this point and ask if I have a rejoinder over here, as to how and why we got into Vietnam.

Mr. BUNDY. Well, let me say first, going back through Mr. Clubb's argument, that I think there is no legal justification for an assertion that you cannot act to meet commitments under the SEATO Treaty without an authorizing vote. The treaty does not say that. The provisions of the treaty do not require that. And it seems to me quite clear that the United States is acting within the legal and moral commitments of the SEATO Treaty.

Going back further, the United Nations Charter explicitly provides for the right of individual and collective self-defense, and the United States has complied with those provisions of the charter which require that actions taken under that clause be reported to the United Nations, and it is surely not the fault of the United States that there is adamant opposition on the Communist side to any further engagement of the United Nations in this contest. That may be enough for my share, Mr. Severeid.

Mr. SEVAREID. I think Dr. Hans Morgenthau was giving me a sign a moment ago.

Mr. MORGENTHAU. Well, I would offer two political arguments against the official position that we are in Vietnam in order to honor a commitment, and that we are there in order to defend the freedom of South Vietnam, that we cannot let South Vietnam down.

First of all, one should not overlook the fact that it was we who installed the first government in Saigon, the Diem government. In other words, the state of South Vietnam is in a sense our own creation—for without our support the regime in Saigon could not have lasted for any length of time.

So when we say we must keep a promise, we have really made a promise to our own agents. In a sense, we have contracted with ourselves, and I do not regard this as a valid foundation for our presence in South Vietnam.

Furthermore, even if it were otherwise, I refer you to the statement which Alexander Hamilton made on the occasion of the neutrality proclamation of Washington in 1793, when the United States had an obvious and undoubted treaty agreement to the effect that it must come to the aid of France if France is engaged in a war in Europe. And Hamilton, in a definitive fashion, laid down the principle that no nation is obligated to endanger its own interests, let alone its own existence, in order to come to the aid of another nation.

Secondly, it is obvious from the facts of the situation—I welcome Mr. Pauker's invocation of the fact—that we are quite unwelcome in South Vietnam. There is an abundance of reports to the effect that what most of the South Vietnamese want is to be left alone, and that they would be delighted to see us depart.

A month ago, for instance, the Vietnamese correspondent of the Economist, a very respectable periodical of Great Britain, reported that the slogan which makes the rounds in Saigon is "Yanks, fight your wars elsewhere."

Mr. SEVAREID. We have about 2 minutes left on this question. Can you usefully make use of it, Mr. Brzezinski?

Mr. BRZEZINSKI. I will try. I would like to make two points: one, that it seems to me one cannot assess the Vietnamese issue purely in the terms of the specifics of the Vietnamese history, Geneva Convention, and so forth.

It seems to me that we are involved here in the very basic process of trying to create international stability, a process which we

undertook as we had to in Europe in the late 1940's and the process which I think is now in its beginnings in Asia where conditions are far less stable; our engagements therefore are much more difficult and complicated. Nonetheless, I do not see how the United States could abstain from becoming involved in this process. Otherwise, all of Asia would become rapidly destabilized and there are a great many Asian nations which see a major interest for themselves in America's continued presence in Vietnam as a bulwark.

Secondly, on the specific point whether the Vietnamese want us to get out. Obviously, after 10 years of civil war the paramount desire is for peace. But I do not believe that the paramount desire is for a Communist takeover. Anyone familiar with warfare knows that when an army suffers the kind of casualties the South Vietnamese Army suffered someone is doing some very good fighting. They are not defending, but dying and fighting and this I think is a major indicator of the commitment and of their loyalty.

Mr. SEVAREID. Mr. Brzezinski, I would like to go to the second question that we discussed before, and this is a little more specific.

What is the fundamental nature of this war? Is it aggression from North Vietnam or is it basically a civil war between the peoples of South Vietnam?

Let's start with Dr. Morgenthau.

Dr. MORGENTHAU. I would say, it was also the official position until February of this year that the major problem was a political problem in South Vietnam. And I remember very well at the end of 1955 when I had a long discussion with President Diem that I pointed to the likelihood that his policies would lead to the breakdown of his regime and to a general alienation of the population with the Communists profiting therefrom. So what we had at the beginning, and it is obvious when you look at the development of the civil war in South Vietnam, yet, at the beginning, a revolt, especially of the peasants against the Diem regime and from 1959, 1960 onward, the North Vietnamese Government, to an ever-increasing extent, aided and abetted this revolt. So I find it rather farfetched up to recent months, of course, in recent months since our extension of the war in the North Vietnam situation has changed, but up to February, I find it rather farfetched to speak of aggression for the north. What you had was a revolt in the south aided and abetted from the north.

Mr. SEVAREID. I think Mr. Brzezinski, you wanted to come in there, or was it Dr. Pauker?

Mr. PAUKER. I welcome Professor Morgenthau's acceptance of the factual basis of our discussion. The documents captured from the Vietcong and the statements of Vietcong prisoners, defectors, and civilians who have fled from Vietcong-controlled areas proved to me beyond reasonable doubt that guerrilla warfare operations in South Vietnam had been envisioned by the Communist government of North Vietnam as early as 1954.

Let's recall the facts. At that time after 8 years of war against the French the Vietnamese troops were longing to go home to their villages and families in the south. In spite of this some 90,000 Vietminh fighters of South Vietnam were not allowed to return to their homes but were sent to North Vietnam to be used in case the Hanoi Government did not succeed in staging a Communist takeover in the south by peaceful political means under the cover of the Geneva agreements. These men from the south were indoctrinated politically and trained militarily for several years in North Vietnam. From 1960 to date, about a third of this group as well as several thousand men born in the north have infiltrated into South Vietnam

mostly through Laos across the so-called Ho Chi-minh trail. Almost half of these men are members of the Vietnamese Communist Party.

They formed a cadre that is the hard core of the dedicated fighters of the revolutionary war against the government in Saigon. They are the ones who are taking advantage of the many problems prevailing in South Vietnam as in any transitional society—recruit, train, indoctrinate and lead in combat a younger generation of South Vietnamese villagers.

Of course, the South Vietnamese villagers who have become the bulk of the Vietcong fighting force are recruited not only by naked coercion, but also by a range of appeals exploiting general and local grievances, but they do not understand that the grand strategy of the Communist leaders in North Vietnam is aimed precisely at aggravating these local grievances and preventing any non-Communist government in South Vietnam from coping with them.

Hanoi's grand strategy has been the following: After 1956 terrorists' assassinations of village officials disrupted the administrative machinery of the South Vietnamese Government, weakened Saigon's control of the countryside and created general uneasiness and fear. Then, beginning in 1959, increasing harassment through attacks on South Vietnamese army posts, and ambushes of small units prevented the Saigon government in many parts of the country from protecting the population against Vietcong coercion. To reestablish the balance, the South Vietnamese Government had to appeal to the United States and other friendly countries for increasing amounts of military assistance.

The presence of foreign military forces can now be exploited by Communist propaganda so as to inflame and capture Vietnamese nationalist sentiment in the villages. The young Vietcong recruits see themselves engaged in what the Communists like to call a war of national liberation, but they do not understand that the national liberation front of South Vietnam itself is only a facade. The ultimate purpose of the Hanoi government is to establish in the South a totalitarian rule of the Vietnamese Communist Party. Therefore, in answer to your question, Mr. Severeid, the evidence mainly, captured documents of statements of Vietcong prisoners and defectors makes it clear to me that this is indeed aggression from North Vietnam, but carefully staged so as to make Communist revolutionary war appear as a spontaneous grassroots revolt of the people of South Vietnam.

Mr. SEVAREID. Mr. Pauker, thank you. One man who has spent a good deal of time in the countryside of Vietnam is Mr. Donoghue and I would like to hear from him.

Mr. DONOGHUE. I went to Vietnam to help teach and train people in the National Institute of Administration there, how to do research in villages. Therefore, I spent quite a bit of time in both South Vietnam and central Vietnam, so my view of this whole problem is from the village, from the people. And other reports that I have read corroborate my findings.

Generally speaking, the programs that were initiated all during the Diem regime were initiated by Western-educated, elite people in Saigon and then pushed out into the villages. The villagers were village chiefs who were appointed by the Saigon Government, were poorly trained and unable to carry out these programs.

As a result, the village chiefs resorted to terror and coercion in order to get the peasants to work on certain kinds of programs. The members of anti-Government groups counterthreatened these appointed chiefs and as a result the chiefs and people in the villages were caught in the middle between Government coercion on the one hand and coercion of other groups on the other hand.

Vietcong propaganda played into this and the idea of this was that if we get rid of the Americans and if we get rid of the Government that we will ultimately gain freedom. People believed rightly or wrongly that the Vietcong were the protectors against the coercion of a dictatorial Government that was located far, far away in Saigon.

In the research that we did we found no evidence of northern aggression. Undoubtedly, there was moral support from the North and as was pointed out more recently material aid. Nothing, of course, comparable to the American aid.

Our research indicated that the biggest problem in Vietnam was the alienation of the peasants from the Saigon Government. Thus, I view this as a civil war with most peasants against the Government that we support with the help of the north and most recently the whole thing aimed against foreign interference which they claim stands in the way of national liberation.

The Government in Saigon is not representative of a large majority of peasants who are backing a popular movement for liberation from foreign domination. And by our backing them I feel as though we are violating our legal and moral commitments to the principles of self-determination.

Mr. SEVAREID. We've got about maybe a minute or a minute and a half on this section of the argument and I was about to suggest that Mr. Bundy, you might want to speak to this.

Mr. BUNDY. I would like to make two points on what Professor Morgenthau said.

First, he implied that the U.S. Government has changed its tune on this point within the last few months which is in my judgment simply wrong.

I would like to read just two short quotations as samples. Here is an example from a news conference of Secretary Rusk in November 1961: "The determined and ruthless campaign of propaganda infiltration and subversion by the Communist regime in North Vietnam to destroy the Republic of South Vietnam and subjugate its peoples is a threat to the peace."

There couldn't be a clearer statement of a position which has been repeated a number of times.

I could go right through a whole series of statements which President Johnson and before him, President Kennedy, have made on this. But more compelling evidence in a way is what the Communists themselves say about it.

In 1959 Ho Chi-minh announced in an article in the Belgian Communist organ: "We are building socialism in South Vietnam, but we are building it in only one part of the country while in the other part we still have to direct and bring to a close the middle-class democratic and anti-imperialist revolution," and again in 1963 the North Vietnamese Communist Party organ stated quite simply, "The authorities in South Vietnam," it was speaking of, "are well aware that Vietnam is the firm base for the southern revolution and the point on which it leans and that our party is the steady and experienced vanguard unit of the working class and people and is the brain and factor that decides all victories of the revolution."

We really shouldn't argue about this point because the evidence is overwhelming.

Mr. SEVAREID. Gentlemen, we are about halfway into this discussion and I would like to turn to our third topic or question and this is a large one:

"What are the implications of this Vietnam struggle in terms of the whole rise and future of communism in Asia as a whole, particularly in terms of Communist China's power and aims and future actions?"

Who would like to start on this? Professor Morgenthau?

Dr. MORGENTHAU. It is of course correct to say, that, one cannot look at the Vietnamese situation in isolation from our overall policy in Asia and in isolation from the overall policy in Asia of our enemies. And here come back to what we have discussed before. We are really in Vietnam not because we must honor a commitment or because we want to help the people of South Vietnam who rely on us. We are there because we want to contain communism. And I have no quotation to read from, but I have a very good memory. [Laughter.]

I remember well that for instance the Secretary of Defense has said, and I think quite correctly, that we are in South Vietnam in order to stop communism, and if we don't stop it there we will have to stop it elsewhere, and some people have gone so far as to say if we don't fight in Vietnam we have to fight in Hawaii or perhaps in California.

Now, we are really in Vietnam as part—yes—part and parcel of the containment policy, military containment policy which was eminently successful in Europe against the Soviet Union and in my view is bound to fail in Asia against China. For the situation in China—pardon me, the situation in Asia is fundamentally different from the situation in Europe.

In Europe you could draw a line across a map and tell the Soviet Union, "Until here and not farther." And behind that line on our side you had viable social, political, economic, and military units. Nothing of the kind exists in Asia and secondly and most importantly, the Russian threat was primarily a military threat and against this threat the policy of military containment was indeed adequate and successful.

The threat of China is primarily a political threat and nothing we do in South Vietnam or don't do in South Vietnam is going to make any difference with regard to the potency of such threat in the rest of the world. We may hold South Vietnam. We may win a victory in South Vietnam. This means nothing with regard to whether or not Indonesia will go Communist, or an area in Africa will go Communist, or Colombia will go Communist.

In other words, we have the success of our policy of military containment in Europe that has left us into the fallacy to apply the same instruments to a situation which is entirely different and where such instruments cannot succeed.

Mr. SEVAREID. Mr. Brzezinski?

Mr. BRZEZINSKI. I would like to suggest respectfully that Professor Morgenthau is wrong in his analysis of Asia and of Europe. [Laughter.]

It seems to me that if we go back to the years 1945-48, the problem in Europe was not only a military problem. It was also political and an ideological problem. The Communist guerrillas came within 40 miles of Athens.

Communists, riots, activities in France and Italy were on the verge of success. In both cases the response was not only military but involved the political, social, and economic effort to create stability.

Now, granted the proposition that this undertaking is much more difficult in Asia, but if in Asia it is only political and not a military problem, then why all the fuss about the military response and its alleged danger? It is precisely because it is both a military, a political, and social problem in Asia that the United States has to remain engaged, for there is no other major power in the world which has the resources, the wherewithal to provide both military stability and economic, social, political development.

If the United States becomes disengaged because of a military defeat in southeast Asia, then how can it make its presence felt in a positive sense economically and socially?

I will submit to you that we have some major achievements to our record in Asia

already. We have contributed to social stability and political development in Japan, in Taiwan, in Thailand, in India, which wants us to stay in South Vietnam, in Pakistan, and I think this task ought to go on. Moreover, and I think this is extremely important, it relates to the general condition of the international Communist movement.

We have to continue this undertaking for, if we fail, then in the international Communist movement itself, the Chinese line would have been proven correct; namely, that by fomenting the national liberation struggle, linking it to social unrest and organizing a political movement, you can qualitatively change the course of history.

Peng-chin in his recent speech, which I recommend to you, developed at length—

Mr. MORGENTHAU. Communist propaganda. Mr. BRZEZINSKI. This is a very major statement developing at length the Chinese conception of the present international scene and it is a complete alternative to the Soviet conception, it rejects a notion that such confrontation can escalate into local and global war. It is based on the premise that the United States has neither capacity nor the will to react effectively and it is an attempt in the course of this undertaking to pressure the Soviets to emulate the Chinese.

I believe that if we now disengage from Asia, which I think—which I take it is the course, the brunt of the remarks of the Chinese will have been proven right and this will be a highly destabilized condition for world peace in general.

Dr. MORGENTHAU. Could we state our own position? We didn't ask Mr. Brzezinski to restate it for us. He certainly has said something which I wouldn't have said, and I never have said. But we come to this a little bit later.

I want to make only one point and that is, that if Mr. Brzezinski's analysis is correct, it is quite astounding that the Chinese are obviously most eager to have us continue the war in South Vietnam. They are the ones which oppose any kind of negotiations which might lead to some kind of settlement, but they seem to be enormously eager to increase our commitment and I must say if I were a Chinese statesman I would be very eager, too, because it is exactly because we are here in a blind alley, it is exactly because—it would be very difficult for us to, win a military victory and even if we win it, it means nothing politically. And because the military and political situation is so unfavorable to us, the Chinese are delighted to see us fight in Vietnam.

Mr. SEVAREID. I was turning to Mr. Clubb. I think I have got a minute or two to allow on this side again. Mr. Clubb. Mr. Clubb, would you like to?

Mr. CLUBB. Yes, I should like to make a comment.

I think that the situation in Vietnam is different from the situation in Thailand, India, Japan, or other places. I think that given the fighting there, it is, say, a particular and peculiar situation that we have to attend to only. And the error in our consideration of that is, I believe, the basic assumption that South Vietnamese, Vietcong, are subject to the control of Hanoi, that Hanoi is under the influence of Peiping, and that we should take one side or another in the Peiping-Moscow dispute.

In actuality, it appears to me that the nationalism of the Vietnamese is something which would prove an element of considerable strength against China, ultimately, that we should attend to that and disregard China at this particular moment.

Mr. SEVAREID. Mr. Bundy, would you care to speak to this part?

Mr. BUNDY. I think the point to be made, and it is one which really takes us to the question of what Professor Morgenthau's

real position is that, as he states it, no particular point is worth defending. I think also, that he gravely misstates the policy of the United States in Vietnam when he asserts, I think on quite incomplete, and as far as I know, with no citation, that our policy is merely to contain communism everywhere and that we do not have a specific interest, sustained and important in victory in South Vietnam and I can suggest to him the importance I think of this point by remarking simply that it seems as pike-staff to me that if we are successful there the effects will be constructive and helpful all around southeast Asia and on even wider framework.

Mr. SEVAREID. We have a half second.

Mr. DONOGHUE?

Mr. DONOGHUE. Well, the point is, I do not think we are going to win in South Vietnam and therefore if what these gentlemen say is true, then I think I am quite frightened.

Mr. BRZEZINSKI. I don't accept Mr. Goldwater's conception that if you cannot win the alternative is total defeat. There is such a thing as a military stalemate out of which arrangements can eventually develop. It seems there is a third way.

Mr. SEVAREID. All right.

Mr. BUNDY. There is also an enormous difference between doing the very best you can within the framework of your legitimate interests and commitments and quitting too soon.

Mr. PAUKER. The one point that hasn't been brought in—revolutionary war is a new political-military technique that uses the tensions that exist in all new countries in Asia and Africa for the advancement of the cause of the group that foments this movement. Without the tensions it couldn't be done, but to say this is purely a nationalist movement doesn't make sense. You talk to the Vietcong and they tell you without the help of the North, the front movement would not be reached—would not have reached its present proportion. I read you from one such statement, the front controls only a small portion of the population. Therefore, the supply given to the fronts by the people is rather inadequate from the point of view of labor, material, and financial resources. The front is weak from the point of view of armament, the front does not have the facilities to produce arms and has to rely on the supplies from the North. It was stated in April by a Vietcong cadre.

Mr. SEVAREID. We have about 30 seconds.

Mr. DONOGHUE. I don't think that you have ever talked to a Vietcong because they are very, very difficult to find them. They are very difficult to find because I looked all over for them.

Mr. PAUKER. You were there in 1960.

Mr. DONOGHUE. 1962.

Mr. PAUKER. I was there every year from 1954 to last November. I talked to many Vietcong.

Mr. DONOGHUE. They are very difficult to find and they are clothed, they are housed, they are fed and they are supplied and they are hidden by the peasants in Vietnam.

Mr. SEVAREID. Gentlemen—

Mr. PAUKER. That is not the debate.

Mr. SEVAREID. I think we might very usefully spend the rest of this hour on the fourth and final question we had on our minds before we began and that is the question of alternatives to our present policy in Vietnam.

What are these alternatives? Let me start with Mr. Bundy.

Mr. BUNDY. Well, there are a number of alternatives.

Let me begin by pointing out that the alternative which is more important than the one presented by these gentlemen in terms of real choices and in terms of levels of support by the United States and in terms of

the level of our interest there, and one which has been rejected by the administration is the general and less restrained carrying of the war ever farther northward without regard to cities or population or boundaries or to what country you are choosing to attack or the view that airpower will somehow settle this thing, that there is no issue in South Vietnam. That is not the policy of the administration. That policy was proposed in certain quarters in 1964. It was rejected, it is still rejected. There is a very interesting and important issue in, a more important one in terms of the sentiment of the American people in the general proposal moving toward withdrawal which I take to be, although they were stated for themselves, the position of the gentlemen opposite. Within the framework of the choices available to us, we can move without restraint against those who have engaged in this aggression from the north. We can move toward withdrawal without regard to our obligations to those in South Vietnam or the political consequences in other countries.

We can stay roughly where we are in essentially the passive role or we can carefully and with a choice of specific ways and means move to sustain our part and it can only be our part of a contest which is of great importance to us as it is to the people of Vietnam.

It is not for me, on this occasion, to discuss specifically what steps may come in the future. I think it is fair to say that the position of the administration, and I think the position of a solid and very strong majority of the Congress and of the people, is that we should stay there, that we should do our part, as may become necessary, do only what is necessary, bear in mind that the center of the contest is in South Vietnam though there is more aggression from the north, and seek constantly, as we have for months and months, to find a way to get this dangerous and difficult business to the conference room.

Mr. SEVAREID. Mr. Bundy, has the administration changed its views about negotiating at any level, at any time, with the Vietcong?

Mr. BUNDY. The administration's position is that we will negotiate with governments. Now, there is no barrier to serious negotiations in this question of the Vietcong. The Vietcong have traveled for years on North Vietnamese passports. It is not a difficulty from their point of view if they are ready to see a negotiation, to pass the signal to friends, supporters, and I say directors and controllers. It is not the question of who sits for the Communists that stands in the way of a conference.

Mr. SEVAREID. I want to get clear that we would negotiate with the Vietcong as long as they are legitimately established.

Mr. BUNDY. That is not a question which stands in the way of a conference. We propose to discuss this matter with governments.

Mr. SEVAREID. Mr. Clubb.

Mr. CLUBB. Yes; I should like to make a point.

The absolute alternatives to war and destruction are, of course, peace and construction, and the administration, I gather, agrees with those aims.

However, the administration has been indicating conditions, if you will, people with whom we will negotiate, or discuss, and people with whom we will not.

The question is how to achieve the peace we all desire. And this brings up another question.

Since South Vietnam is a sovereign country, by the observations of Washington, who lays down the conditions for peace—Washington or Saigon?

That appears to me as an important question. It would suggest that we are on our side of the table moving toward withdrawal.

None of us, I think, propose simple withdrawal without negotiation, anything like

that. Moving toward withdrawal—I think the administration would not hold that we plan to remain there forever. In the event that there were a peace agreement, presumably it might make some provision for American withdrawal. In circumstances like that, we might have to face up to the necessity of going.

There was one observation made a long time ago by Horace Walpole, who said that it is easier perhaps to conquer Asia than to know what to do with it. We might apply it to Vietnam.

Mr. SEVAREID. Gentlemen, this is free and open, now.

Mr. PAUKER. I would like to end my previous argument with Mr. Donoghue. One cannot refer to 1960 or 1962 field work in order to know what the situation is today. Nobody denies, Mr. Donoghue, that the Vietcong gets support from the villages. The question is under what conditions and how the atmosphere in the villages itself is changing.

The Vietcong at the time that you were there, were fairly well received in the villages. The Vietcong are increasingly considered a heavy burden by the villages. Their taxation rate is higher than it was around that time, and the villages are beginning to be quite tired with what is going on in the villages.

Now, there is, I think, a difference between an organized and well disciplined elite, and a feeling of the whole population. And I think that none of us with the training we have should speak about "the Vietnamese say." One cannot go to Saigon and talk to the proverbial taxi driver and claim to speak for all groups.

Mr. SEVAREID. Mr. Pauker, I would like to get back to this question of the alternative to our policy. And I think Dr. Morgenthau has something on his mind.

Mr. MORGENTHAU. There are I think theoretically speaking five alternatives which are before us.

We can get out, without further ado.

Second, we can—we don't need to oppose moves which in the past have been made by the Government in Saigon to come to an understanding with the Vietcong which would lead to our departure on their invitation, and the invitation of the Government in Saigon.

Third, we can greatly increase the air attacks going farther and farther north.

Fourth, we can greatly increase our commitment on land by sending a couple of hundred thousand, or as Mr. Hanson Baldwin suggested, a million men to Vietnam. Or we can, as Senator FULBRIGHT recently suggested, try to hold a few strong points on the coast of Vietnam, proving to the Vietcong that they cannot win a military victory, and on that basis try to negotiate with them in the fall.

Now, my personal position, which must come as a surprise to some listeners here, is that Mr. FULBRIGHT's position is by far the most acceptable from my point of view.

I think our aim must be to get out of Vietnam, but to get out of it with honor.

I would indeed—I have indeed always believed that it is impossible for a great power which must take care of its prestige to admit in so many words that its policy has been mistaken during the last 10 years and leave the theater of operation. But there are all kinds of face-saving devices by which a nation or a government which has made a series of mistakes can rectify the situation, and I think President de Gaulle has shown how to go about this with regard to Algeria. And certainly if you look at the prestige of France today, it is certainly higher than it was when France fought in Indochina.

If I may just say one sentence about the previous discussion about the fact. It is, of course, obvious, and it has been obvious

to me all along, that the Government lives in a different factual world from the factual world in which its critics live. It is an open question who is psychotic in this respect, who has created a kind of a quasi-world in which he lives.

But I would call the attention to the fact that my view of the facts is certainly supported by all of those observers from neutral or friendly countries who have been in Vietnam, who have lived with the Vietcong. I remind you of the articles in L'Express by Mr. Chauffard, I remind you of the articles in the Figaro by its correspondent. I remind you of the articles in the Economist. They all support my general view of what the factual situation in Vietnam is.

And I should also say that the factual situation, the deterioration of the military situation is infinitely graver than we have been made to believe on the basis of official and nonofficial reports.

You see, for instance, the desertion rate of the Vietnamese Army in recent months has been enormous. Generally it has been said that the recruits desert at the rate of 30 percent. But around Da Nang, in the war zone, 40 percent of the combatant units have in recent weeks defected.

Mr. BUNDY. I simply have to break in, if I may, Mr. Severeid, and say that I think that Professor Morgenthau was wrong on his facts as to the desertion rates, wrong in his summary of the Chauffard and Express articles, wrong in his view of what the economist says, and I am sorry to say giving vent to his congenital pessimism with respect to these matters. And I want to take a moment to give you direct quotations to show what I mean.

In 1956 Professor Morgenthau wrote of Western Europe: "Communism is far from defeated in Western Europe, and the Marshall plan is partly to blame for that failure. The dangers to the stability and strength of Western Europe which have grown in the past and the defects of that structure have continued to grow, because those defects were not repaired. The Marshall plan almost completely lost sight of those roots of instability and unrest which antedated the emergency and were bound to operate after its was over."

And it is only 9 years later that he tells us that "the Marshall plan was eminently successful in Europe" and that to the west of that boundary there lay an ancient civilization which was but temporarily in disarray and which proved itself capable of containing Communist subversion.

And closer to home, just 4 years ago, Professor Morgenthau wrote about Laos two things which are interesting.

"As these lines are being written, early June, the Communist domination of Laos is virtually a foregone conclusion." And reading the mind of the administration he went on to say, "The administration has reconciled itself to the loss of Laos."

Now, neither of those things is true, neither of them has happened, neither of them corresponds to the reality of the political situation in southeast Asia.

Mr. MORGENTHAU. I may have been dead wrong on Laos, but it doesn't prove that I am dead wrong on Vietnam.

Mr. SEVAREID. Since this has become something of a personal confrontation I think Professor Morgenthau should have a small chance at least to answer Mr. Bundy.

First I would like to hear from Mr. Brzezinski for about 1 minute.

Mr. BRZEZINSKI. All right—I would like to make basically four points, in 1 minute.

It seems to me very important to keep making it very clear we are not trying to overthrow the North Vietnamese Government. In other words, there is no effort here to roll back the Communist world. Because I think this has effects on the Soviet attitude and elsewhere.

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Second, we have to make it very clear that we ourselves are not going to be thrown out of South Vietnam, because this eventually can create preconditions for negotiations. And I believe we can do this in spite of the apocalyptic predictions by some people that this will lead to a world war with China or with the Soviet Union or to a homogeneous Communist world.

Third, I think we have to strive in the long run to separate the North Vietnamese interest from the Chinese interest, and that interest can be separated when the North Vietnamese leaders begin to realize that the war in the south does not give them victory but does give them mounting destruction in the north which the Chinese are perfectly willing to afford, because they would like to see this war continue.

And lastly, we ought to try to maintain contact with the more moderate section of the Communist world, stimulate trade with them, greater contacts, so that they themselves will see an interest in stability and will try to use their influence on the more revolutionary wing of the Communist movement, or if not then at least will be compelled to separate themselves from it, indeed as a result of mounting Chinese attacks on them as recent indications point.

Mr. SEVAREID. A long but very fascinating 1 minute, Mr. Brzezinski. Thank you very much.

Now, I do think Professor Morgenthau ought to have a chance to respond to the direct criticism made by Mr. Bundy at this time.

Mr. MORGENTHAU. I admire the efficiency of Mr. Bundy's office—

Mr. BUNDY. I do my own.

Mr. MORGENTHAU. Oh, well, I am honored by the selected quotations from my writings.

As I have said before, nobody—privately has said this—nobody who deals with foreign policy professionally can be always right. Obviously one makes mistakes. And I probably was too pessimistic about Laos. But not terribly more pessimistic than the situation warranted.

I should also say, to quote a great man, that I have not always been wrong. And especially when it comes to Vietnam, Mr. Bundy might have quoted certain things I wrote in 1961 and 1962 or quoted what I wrote at the end of 1965 after my interview with President Diem about what the future of South Vietnam might be.

So I think no useful purpose is served by pointing to one mistake, and I admit freely that I have made mistakes, I have made many more than Mr. Bundy has found—but I have not always been wrong. And in any case it is no argument to say this man has been wrong about Laos, how can he be right on Vietnam.

Mr. BUNDY. Actually what Mr. Morgenthau said about Vietnam in 1956—this is the one I happen to have here—was that a miracle had been wrought under President Diem.

Mr. MORGENTHAU. I stand by that. All right.

Mr. SEVAREID. I don't know whether they are in agreement at this point or not, at least about their disagreement. I think we have got about 2 minutes here.

I thought we would close between Mr. Bundy and Mr. Morgenthau, but we have played a little game of checkers and jumped over that.

I would like to hear from Mr. Clubb, I think, and then from Mr. Pauker.

Mr. CLUBB. I think the record of predictions in Washington is none too good. So perhaps we ought to abandon that particular line of thought.

I should like to get back to the matter of alternatives.

It was suggested that we perhaps should seek face-saving devices. We may just drop the face-saving—although it seems to be important. And here I should say that those

three treaties that I remarked are really applicable, and one way that we can get out of the present predicament, if we choose to do so, is to consult with our allies and friends, and if no better other approach offers itself, bring the matter officially before the United Nations to the end that peace might be restored to this unhappy land in Vietnam and the hungry people of that war-torn land be helped to proceed with economic reconstruction and economic progress for enjoyment of the human happiness now denied them.

Mr. SEVAREID. Mr. Pauker, I think we have got about one-half a minute.

Mr. PAUKER. Thank you. I have to speak fast.

If you go to Vietnam now, Mr. Donoghue, and try to speak to one of these hard to find Vietcong, he would tell you what this man said in April to one of my friends. He said, "I came to understand now how the Vietcong transformed the people into machines, devoid of all thought," and that is why he defected. Then he was asked what would the front do. And he said, "The front, after it takes over the Government, will continue to maintain South Vietnam as a neutral country. It was announced that the South belongs to the North or to the Communist bloc. If the front does, the Americans would have an excuse to return to South Vietnam. This is the Vietcong scheme. Later on the Vietcong will gradually transform the south into a Communist state. That is clear."

Mr. SEVAREID. Gentleman, television timing is somewhat inexorable. I will have to cut this off. I didn't know we would end up somewhere in a village in South Vietnam, but here we are. The hour is gone.

I want to thank all of these gentlemen very much, and this audience for coming out on this warm night.

This is Eric Sevaroid in Washington. Good night.

SERVICEMAN STATES LACK OF GI BILL IS FALSE ECONOMY

Mr. YARBOROUGH. Mr. President, failure of the administration to give its full and active support to the Cold War G.I. education bill is causing an unreasonable delay in the prompt enactment of this necessary legislation.

I ask unanimous consent that there be printed in the RECORD a letter from Lt. Thomas J. Byrnes, A.P.O. New York, N.Y., in support of the G.I. bill. The letter is dated June 3, 1965, and expresses the keen dissatisfaction of many hundreds of thousands of young men and young women in both civilian and military life with the administration's position to date on Senate bill 9, the Cold War G.I. education bill.

There being no objection, the letter was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

CLASS B AGENT, 45TH FIN. SEC.,
New York, N.Y., June 3, 1965.

The Honorable R. W. YARBOROUGH,
Chairman, Subcommittee on Veterans' Affairs U.S. Senate, Washington, D.C.

DEAR SIR: Thank you for your reply to my letter supporting passage of a GI Bill of Rights. I was pleased to read in the Stars and Stripes that the Senate Labor and Public Welfare Committee has approved this bill and that there are more than 40 cosponsors of this legislation. It was a bit perplexed to read that this legislation is not fully supported by the administration on the basis that it would be too expensive and would serve to discourage re-enlistments.

I would like to state that I don't understand how an administration which has declared war on poverty and is in the process of

sending bills to Congress which call for the expenditure of millions on the Peace Corps, the Job Corps, education, medicare and foreign aid can say that this bill would be too expensive. When it comes to helping men who have given some of the best years of their life in the service of their country, it becomes a matter of it being too costly. We give funds to students through the National Defense Loans and Grants but we can't afford to give the men who stand day after day on the frontiers of freedom some help when they complete their service because it costs too much. Something is definitely wrong with this standard of values.

In answer to the other voiced objection of the administration to this bill I would like to state that after almost 4 years in the service, in which time I have discussed re-enlistment and extension of service with many of my fellow officers and subordinates I have found that the reasons given for not staying in the Army are seldom related to the money they are paid or the greater opportunities that are available to them as civilians. Most men come into the Army with the intention of rendering the service they feel they are privileged to be able to give in order to keep our country free and strong. Those men have no intention of making it a career and there isn't much chance that anything will change their mind. Those who are undecided or who intend to stay on, leave for many reasons and I will mention a few. Perhaps they are disheartened by the fact that they can't get adequate housing for their family on post for at least a year in most cases; and if they decide to get a home on the economy they have to pay exorbitant rent for furnished apartments because their weight allowance doesn't permit them to bring their own furniture. The weight allowances are limited because Government-furnished housing is supposedly available. Maybe they have had to wait 3 or 4 hours with a sick child before a doctor gets to see them. Maybe they have had to wait 3 or 4 months between appointments for dental care for themselves or their dependents. It's my opinion that if the Army were to use its MOS test system and commanders' rating as a basis for promotions as the Navy does, one of the biggest obstacles to retention would be eliminated.

I hope that you will consider my objections to the reasoning of the Administration in this matter and that you will consider them when legislation is presented to Congress for passage.

Sincerely yours,

THOMAS J. BYRNES,
First Lieutenant FC.

THE BALTIC STATES: A TRIBUTE

Mr. WILLIAMS of New Jersey. Mr. President, 25 years ago, Lithuania and her sister Baltic States, Latvia and Estonia, were invaded by Soviet military forces. Within a matter of a few weeks, all three states were incorporated into the U.S.S.R. as constituent republics.

On this occasion, we pay tribute to a gifted and heroic people who in their national life had sought no more than to live in peace and security. During the interwar period, the Lithuanians accomplished a great deal. Their state had every right to continue in freedom and independence.

But, international politics being what they are, small nations are more often than not the pawns of the great powers; and in the case of the Baltic peoples, this generalization is truly applicable. The Baltic States declared their neutrality in the European war that broke out in 1939; but Soviet expansionist interests had to

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be satisfied—and satisfied they were, at the expense of the Baltic peoples.

We honor the Lithuanian people; and we honor also their Baltic neighbors who share a common fate. Let us all pray that their hopes and expectations for the future will become a reality, and that once again they will enjoy the fruits of liberty.

PROBLEMS OF ALLIANCE OPERATIONS AND THE CRISIS IN NATO

Mr. JACKSON. Mr. President, in its study of the conduct of national security policy, the Subcommittee on National Security and International Operations this week received from Prof. Richard E. Neustadt perceptive testimony on the problems of alliance operations and the crisis in NATO.

An eminent analyst of the Presidency, the author of "Presidential Power"—1960—and a consultant to President Kennedy and to President Johnson, Richard Neustadt is a professor of government at Harvard University and is associate dean of the Harvard Graduate School of Public Administration.

I believe Professor Neustadt's initial statement at our hearing on June 29 will be of special interest to all Senators, and also to other Government officials in Washington and to many private citizens. Therefore, I ask unanimous consent that the statement be printed at this point in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the statement was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

STATEMENT BEFORE SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY AND INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS

(By Richard E. Neustadt, professor of government at Harvard University, June 29, 1965)

Mr. Chairman, members of the subcommittee, I take your invitation to appear today as a command which I obey with pleasure and appreciation. This is, for me, a rather sentimental occasion, having been associated with your work, from time to time, since the first "Jackson Subcommittee" got its start 6 years ago. Also, this occasion lets me emphasize again the gratitude of those of us who teach in universities for your assistance to our work these past 6 years.

Whether you know it or not—and I expect you do—the academic specialists in policy development lean heavily upon you as a source of reading matter for their students. Your subcommittee documents appear routinely in the reading lists and reference books assigned to college classes across the country. There is no comparable source of information and appraisal on the conduct of our Government in foreign affairs. So, on behalf of all of us who teach, and for our students: Thanks.

You have asked me to consider and to comment on ideas and issues raised in the initial memorandum of April 26, with which you opened this new phase of your continuing inquiry. So far as I am able I am happy to respond, but I am conscious of two limitations as I do so. Let me tell you what these are:

First, the memorandum bristles with questions, many of them basic, penetrating questions—any many of these penetrate beyond my range of observation or analysis. They impress me very much as the right questions to ask. But I do not impress myself at all as the man with the right answers. Indeed, I have no ready answers.

My professional preoccupation, as you know, has been what someone recently called "President watching"—to which, of late I've added as a hobby a bit of intermittent Prime Minister watching. But no one save a President or Premier really can be expert on the conduct of their offices. And not even a President knows half of what goes on beneath him and around him in our governmental world, to say nothing of other governments. As an observer—for the most part an observer from outside—I know a great deal less. So all I have to offer are some personal reflections drawn from limited observation.

Second, I appear here at a moment when our Government is struggling with the very sharp dilemmas of two complicated crisis operations overseas, while academic criticism of them both mounts higher than at any time I can remember since the regime of the late John Foster Dulles. But even though I come here with an academic title, I've no stomach for the role of critic-of-the-moment. Nothing I shall say here passes judgment on our current operations. I have enough experience in Government to know how much I do not know, from the outside, about the issues of Vietnam and the Dominican Republic as those present themselves to our decision-makers. And I have too much sympathy for men who bear the burdens of decision to allow myself the luxury of current criticism without current information.

So much for limitations. Now for your memorandum: I find in it two fresh conceptions which strike me as particularly worth pursuing. The first of these is what you have called operational feasibility. The second relates to alliance operations. Let me deal with each in turn.

OPERATIONAL FEASIBILITY

Your memorandum states:

"Top policy officers tend to pay a great deal of attention to what is called political feasibility. They also need to give a great deal of attention to what we might call operational feasibility. Is the plan of action do-able, in terms of real men * * * given the realistic limitations of knowledge, resources, and organizations with which they must make do?"

The distinction you suggest here is important. Government decisions, action decisions, the decisions which accrete into what we call public policy, always involve weighing the desirable against the feasible. The public officer at every action-level asks himself not only what but also how, considering not only goals but also ways and means, and then he calculates his chances to secure the means. Consciously or not, the man in public office has to make that calculation every time he contemplates an action. (The academic man does not, which frequently accounts for differences between them.)

And it is fair, I think, to say what your statement implies, namely that our public officers have generally inclined to make the calculation without bothering their heads too much about administrative means. Generally speaking, they have tended to assume that if they could secure political assent, they could invent, or improvise, or somehow force the requisite responses from the men who actually would do the work, in Government and out. The great machines of management would surely manage somehow, if the necessary sectors of the public, or the press, or Congress, or the Cabinet, as the case might be, were acquiescent.

That assumption probably has roots deep in our history: Americans have often improvised the means to do what nobody had done before. We invented federalism, won the west, conducted civil war on an unprecedented scale, coped with immigration, mastered mass production, built the Panama Canal.

And since the start of World War II, when

we began to fashion our defense and our diplomacy in modern terms, we frequently have followed the assumption in those spheres as well, with consequences which appear to prove it out. Witness Franklin Roosevelt's war-production targets, and lend lease, or Harry Truman's aid to Greece, the Marshall plan, the Berlin airlift, NATO. In instances like these, a calculation of administrative prospects from the standpoint of existing capabilities or past performance would have been depressing, to say the least. Happily, the men who made such calculations at the time—and drew from them the counsel of inaction—were overruled by Presidents with faith that we could improvise. In these instances, and others of the sort, the faith was justified.

But faith was helped by fortune in these cases. Running through them all were certain favoring conditions. These were instances when we espoused a large objective, simple in conception, easily identified and understood by managers at many levels, bearing some analogy to previous experience, and calling for an effort of great scale, not great precision. These were, moreover, cases where the need was plain enough to spur the effort. An overriding menace to our country was personified in Hitler, then in Stalin. And where we had to work through governments abroad, their operators saw the menace too, and saw it in our terms, and even more so. Also we were favored rather often by good luck: Tito's break with Stalin, for example, cost the Greek guerrillas an important sanctuary.

Such favoring conditions, I suspect, become prerequisites for an effective outcome of decisions which take management on faith. Unfortunately, these conditions are not always present. In their absence, portions of our record since the war wear quite a different look than do the instances just cited. They wear a look of ineffectuality. Here too, the issues of administrative feasibility were not pursued until after decisions had been taken. But here the consequences were unhappy. Faith in our capacity to improvise is justified, it seems, under particular conditions, and not otherwise.

Let me cite a few examples on the unsuccessful side: consider Roosevelt's wartime aim, from 1942, that we should occupy a northern zone in Germany, extending to Berlin. Or take what is supposed to have been his decision that we should not let the French return to Indochina. Or think of Truman trying to conduct a limited war with General MacArthur as his agent. Or look at Eisenhower trying in the last year of his term to move toward a détente with Soviet Russia. Or take Kennedy's endeavor in the first weeks of his term to undermine the government of Cuba.

In all these cases we had qualified objectives, subtle aims based on a line of reasoning and on anticipations which were far from fully understood by operators in our own or other governments, and often were not shared by those who did perceive them. Subtlety was matched by strangeness; we were trying to accomplish unfamiliar things in unaccustomed ways. Effective follow-through would have required great precision in obtaining information and coordinating action on the part of the American bureaucracy. It also would have called for great precision in relating our own actions to the acts of other governments. But large-scale organizations find it hard to be precise. And it is hardest when they tackle novel tasks for obscure reasons.

The Korean war provides perhaps the most dramatic instances where our decision-makers took too much for granted on the side of operational feasibility. In the fall of 1950 there were few things Truman wanted less than a severe and costly clash with the Chinese. But to assure himself that he could minimize the cost would have required him to override the then prevailing military

portedly wants to be mayor after Wagner. * * * Poverty Corporation, which he'd head, ultimately would have 16 poverty centers, providing unusual opportunity to set up a widespread patronage machine. * * * Convinced city must retain strong control over where, how its money is spent. * * * Feels OEO buckled under pressure, first approving 11-6 formula for city control of corporation, then saying city hall must give indigenous poor, community leaders greater powers. * * * Says he offered to turn entire poverty program over to voluntary and sectarian community organizations last week but they refused. * * * Heard reports about possible trouble at Haryou-ACT but, after playing heavy in investigation at Mobilization for Youth, has chosen to stay out of this one.

Dr. Kenneth Clark: professor of psychology at City College whose work was cited in the 1954 school desegregation decision. * * * "Father" of 614-page research document, "Youth in the Ghetto," considered to be a masterful documentation of poverty in Harlem. * * * Former director of Haryou but lost out in struggle for control of Harlem antipoverty program. * * * His reported fight with Congressman POWELL for control ended with the naming of Livingston Wingate as executive director of Haryou-ACT. * * * A merger of Haryou with the Associated Community Teams, which Representative POWELL reportedly controlled. * * * Has plans for his own poverty program for selected young people in Harlem.

Rev. Dr. David W. Barry: Executive director of the New York City Mission Society, a nondenominational missionary organization that concentrates its efforts in "difficult" urban areas. * * * Assistant treasurer and member of the board of Haryou-ACT. * * * An outspoken critic of "secrecy" concerning city's poverty proposals. * * * Favors greater participation by poor in design, review, and carrying out of poverty programs. * * * Sees Economic Opportunity Act as just a more "sophisticated brand of welfare" unless this is done. * * * Has never seen the "hand of Congressman" POWELL in any of Haryou-ACT's programs or policies. * * * Feels that Haryou-ACT is doing a good job and that charges of wrongdoing are "nonsense."

Anne Roberts: Staff director of the city's antipoverty operations board, she receives \$22,500 a year, has been caught in the middle in most of the battles raging around the city's war against poverty. * * * Her office did big job in March in finishing city's mammoth \$10.5 million request to OEO including outline for poverty centers since has seen program become a political football. * * * City hall refers most press questions about program to her office, rarely provides her with necessary answers. * * * Also has heard about rumors of trouble at Haryou-ACT but lacks authority, desire to do anything about them.

OUR GOAL IN VIETNAM: LAW AND ORDER THROUGH SELF-GOVERNMENT

(Mr. MULTER (at the request of Mr. FOLEY) was granted permission to extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. MULTER. Mr. Speaker, through all the smoke created by the small fires built by the administration's critics one thing can still be seen: we must not let the Communists win in Vietnam.

Support for this policy is stated very succinctly in the following editorial from the June 24, 1965, edition of the New York Journal American and the June 20, 1965, editorial broadcast by station WMAL here in Washington:

[From the New York Journal American, June 24, 1965]

THE PROFS

The TV debate in which Presidential assistant McGeorge Bundy upheld President Johnson's Vietnam policy against three academic critics had one heartening aspect.

The critics, headed by Prof. Hans Morgenthau, of Chicago University, took the line in general that the United States had no business being in Vietnam and ought to clear out. There was nothing startlingly new about that. It is the line followed in those slanted "teach-ins."

What was encouraging was the appearance of another professor in support of the Johnson policy. He is Zbigniew Brzezinski, director of the Research Institute on Communist Affairs at Columbia University—in brief, an expert.

He made the point that the Vietnam war was not just a local issue but one of far-reaching consequences to the stability of the world and inside the Communist world.

He went on to say that unless the United States resisted communism in Vietnam effectively, Communist China would win the argument with the Soviet Union about the best way to proceed against the Western World, and would foment further trouble throughout the world.

Applause from here, professor.

VIETNAM

(An editorial broadcast by WMAL, Washington, D.C., June 20, 1965)

What started as a small-scale military advisory unit in South Vietnam has grown into a full-scale military operation. In an area a little larger than Florida, we are now firmly committed to a war that must be won.

Some people apparently are still confused about our basic policy in southeast Asia. The President has frequently stated that our goal in Vietnam is to help establish law and order through self-government without Communist intervention. The goal is simple and easy to understand. Unfortunately, it is very difficult to achieve. However, it can be reached if everyone pulls together and supports the President's policy in Vietnam.

MINING INDUSTRY EXECUTIVE EXAMINES NEED FOR A NATIONAL MINERALS POLICY

(Mr. ASPINALL (at the request of Mr. FOLEY) was granted permission to extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. ASPINALL. Mr. Speaker, from time to time I have discussed before this body the need for a national minerals policy and the need for specific policies with regard to specific minerals. Today I would like to bring to the attention of the Members of the House of Representatives the remarks on this subject that were made by one of the outstanding leaders of the mining industry in the United States.

Speaking before the Central Appalachian Section of the American Institute of Mining, Metallurgical, and Petroleum Engineers at Abingdon, Va., June 18, 1965, Lindsay F. Johnson, vice president of the New Jersey Zinc Co., made a very perceptive analysis of the current situation.

Under leave previously granted, I include the text of his remarks at this point in the RECORD and urge all Members to read it:

GOVERNMENT POLICIES AS RELATED TO THE U.S. MINING INDUSTRY

(Talk given by Lindsey F. Johnson, vice president, the New Jersey Zinc Co., before the Central Appalachian Section of the American Institute of Mining, Metallurgical, and Petroleum Engineers, at Abingdon, Va., June 18, 1965)

The advertised subject for discussion today is "Government Policies as Related to the U.S. Mining Industry."

I am sure you all realize the impossibility of even beginning to attack that subject in any specific detail in the 15 or 20 minutes available to us at this time. So, I am going to have to discuss it in broad rather than specific terms.

And rather than dealing with any particular matter of policy or any particular segment of U.S. mining, I would like to talk more generally about the nature and character of Government policy as it relates to your chosen field of endeavor.

Before I proceed further permit me to dwell for a moment on a matter of definition and possibly a question of semantics. The words I wish to deal with are, first, "policy," and, second, "position."

I believe it will be accepted that when we speak of a policy, as, for example, a Government policy, generally we envision something that has been reached and consolidated after careful study and a weighing of all the factors bearing on the subject, past, present, and future, insofar as they can be seen. A policy, whether one agrees or disagrees with it, is not something to be taken lightly, nor is it something that one believes is easily subject to change. There seems to be a certain permanence to policy.

On the other hand, when we speak of a position, as, for example, the Government position, we do not necessarily envision something with the same degree of solidity or permanence as policy. Positions are sometimes taken without benefit of thorough study and analysis. Positions are often subject to change. We know that even the Government changes its position frequently from day to day.

Accordingly, I will refer mostly to the Government's position in relation to U.S. mining, rather than the Government's policy, because I do not believe the Government as a whole has a well-studied and well-conceived program that warrants the classification of policy with respect to mining. Furthermore, I have a fervent hope that the Government's position can and will be changed.

It is my hope that I can leave with you today an awareness that the Government's policy, or rather the Government's position, covers the U.S. mining industry like a blanket, an awareness that impact on your industry can originate from quite unsuspected sources within the Government, an awareness that, unfortunately, as we see it today, the Government position falls fully to recognize inherent economic and technical problems of your industry.

It is my further hope that growing from that awareness there will be a desire on your part to learn more about these Government positions and to seek a place of influence in bringing to bear on the policymakers or position takers more of the facts of life as you see them from your knowledgeable position.

I think there can be only agreement with the principle that the rise of the United States as a nation to its position of eminence in technical, economic, and political matters in a relatively short span of a couple hundred years has been due to a foundation of abundant natural resources and the will and skill to find, develop, recover, and utilize them.

For many, many decades in the early history of our Nation the will to undertake the financial and physical risks of finding and

recovering minerals was stimulated by the need for them in a growing economy.

Such Government policy as evolved in this period seems to have supported the idea that it was best for our needs to be supplied by winning natural resources within our own borders and that it was in the national interest to encourage such winning as a profitable and important segment of our national economy.

We find in these modern times, however, a greatly different and, to my mind, alarming philosophy that appears to guide Government policy or positions.

If one examines in detail the current Government position with respect to such matters as accessibility of public lands for mineral exploration and development, Government stockpiles of metals, a trend toward free trade by elimination of tariffs and quotas heretofore considered necessary and desirable, an apparent willingness to desert domestic sources for a reckless dependence on foreign sources for vital raw materials, the conclusion must be that Government policy today at best merely tolerates domestic mining; it does not seem to accept it as a vital part of our national economy that should be encouraged to stability and stimulated to further growth.

These are harsh and disappointing conclusions, and we must ask ourselves why they should have to be made.

This in turn requires us to look to those who make the policies or take the positions, or fail to make policies or take positions, and in the motivations that are involved.

As in the case of Government policy on most matters, policy or positions with respect to the U.S. mining industry originate or are consolidated mostly within the executive branch of the Government. Importantly, however, policy can be, and continually is, expressed by the Congress, and we can be mighty thankful for that. Otherwise, we would be completely submerged by bureaucracy, and it is well known that even the Congress sometimes has difficulty penetrating the doctrinaire positions that have become a way of life in some departments of the executive branch. But more later on that and the current efforts of the Congress in this regard.

When we come to appraise the executive departments that have to do with positions related to domestic mining, oddly enough we have to look at the State Department first. One may well ask, "What does the State Department have to do with mining in the United States?"

Much of the answer lies in the fact that overall mineral needs of the United States involve not only supplies from domestic sources but supplies from abroad. Of some things we have none; for example, tin. Of some we have part of what we need; for example, lead and zinc. Of few do we have all we need, but there are some, for example, coal. Because of numerous factors concerning relative grades of ore, relative labor costs, and various types of control and assistance by foreign governments, it has in the past been considered necessary and desirable to provide certain types of moderate import controls to compensate the advantages that thus accrue to foreign producers over U.S. miners.

The State Department is in a position to view the mineral needs of the United States as part of a game on a great international chessboard. They make it entirely clear that they wish to have a pretty free hand to negotiate, to trade, to concede, to give away, or to do anything that seems to best fit foreign policy of the moment, and we have had it made pretty clear to us on some occasions that the interests of domestic mining are wholly secondary.

Since the State Department is strongly represented and highly influential on many interagency committees that advise the

President, its philosophies carry through to the fixing of Government policies or positions, and those philosophies do not generally favor measures that are advocated by the industry or by the Congress as essential to maintenance of healthy and stable conditions in mining industries. The reason generally is that such measures would restrict the ability of the State Department to bargain in the international scene in any way it sees fit, regardless of the effect on domestic enterprises.

Next, we come to an appraisal of the attitude and position of the Department of the Interior with respect to the U.S. mining industry.

It has always been my thought, and I believe it is shared by many others, that Interior is the department of government that generally has stewardship of the Nation's natural resources. By stewardship, I mean an overall responsibility for cooperating with private enterprise to the end that the Nation's natural resources are wisely extracted and used and that conditions are such that our natural resources can be developed and be abundantly available to the Nation's consuming industries in preference to dependence upon supplies from foreign sources.

I believe at this point it must be apparent to you that I am about to be critical of some of the positions of the Department of the Interior, and that is quite correct. Before doing so, however, let me say that I do not want there to be any misunderstanding about my position with respect to the Bureau of Mines, which is but a part of the Department of the Interior, performing specific functions and services—and in my judgment the Bureau does a fine job in this regard. Fortunately, it does not become involved to any great extent in broad policy matters with which the Department concerns itself. These comments apply likewise to many other branches of government departments having to do with mining, whose primary functions are in specific technical fields and do not usually involve the broader economic and political considerations.

With respect to Interior, it has always seemed reasonable to assume that if the mining industry were to have an advocate to stand up for it in intergovernmental circles, it naturally would be Interior. But somehow it does not seem to work out that way. Generally, it seems that those concerned with the mining industries in the United States find Interior disagreeing with them far more than agreeing. They find Interior in active opposition to proposals made by the industry and by the Congress for promoting conditions required for long-range stability in mining and conditions that will encourage further investment in development of natural resources. The record is full of such opposition.

Interior does carry weight in the intergovernmental committees that have to do with establishment of positions. It is perhaps wholly unfair to imply that Interior never stands up for long-range welfare of mining. It undoubtedly does on occasion. It is apparent, however, that Interior seems to succumb rather easily to the more dominating positions taken by others in the executive circle, such as the State Department, and even though it is fully aware of the problems encountered by some segments of the mining industry with respect to foreign competition, as one example, Interior is inclined to prefer the route of temporary palliatives rather than promoting and supporting measures that will get at the long-range needs of U.S. mining industries.

Other Departments, such as, Treasury, Commerce, and Labor, also participate in intergovernmental policy groups concerned with matters affecting domestic mining, such as, import controls, but apparently not with the same force and effect as State, nor with the basic interest and responsibility

that should be carried by Interior. Even the Department of Agriculture gets into the act determining positions and policy, not so much by design but by actions. This Department has the power to barter agricultural products for metals, and often we find ourselves in the position of seeing the Department adding to surplus supplies of metals by putting into our stockpiles metals produced in foreign countries.

In these circumstances, it is not surprising that no effective long-range minerals policy has been forthcoming from the executive branch of the Government, because our Chief Executive must rely on these various Departments for advice, and it is apparent that none of them, for various reasons have the will or inclination to come forth with a constructive policy.

Now to return to the Congress and its position with respect to the need for strong and healthy mining industries. Here the mining industries have many friends, who have a great appreciation of the necessity of constructive development and maintenance of mining in the United States in order not only to contribute importantly to the Nation's economy but also to provide and maintain a mobilization base for emergency.

The interest of the Congress in establishment of a long-range progressive U.S. minerals policy is not new. There are many in both Houses of the Congress and in both major parties who have been with the problem for years. But as I mentioned earlier, they, too, have much difficulty in penetrating bureaucracy.

As long ago as 1959 both Houses of the 86th Congress overwhelmingly adopted House Concurrent Resolution 177 in which it was declared that the sense of the Congress was that "the maintenance and development of a sound and stable minerals industry, without critical dependence upon foreign sources, is essential to the national security and the welfare of the consuming public." Among other things, the resolution also states that the national interest requires the discovery and development of additional domestic mineral resources and also more research to permit better utilization of them.

This resolution, in effect, called upon the executive branch of the Government to establish and actively to effectuate a long-range minerals policy that would meet the sense of the Congress as expressed in the resolution.

That was 5 long years ago; and what has been the response?

Let me not be the one to give you the answer, but permit me to turn to one most highly competent to answer, the Honorable WAYNE N. ASPINALL, chairman of the House Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs. The mining industry has no better friend. Speaking to that question before the Colorado plateau section of the AIME at Denver last month, he said:

"We have enacted legislation to encourage exploration for and discovery of new sources of minerals, and a program under the direction of the Secretary of the Interior has been established. We have provided funds for expanded research and we have created a new Office of Coal Research. But, we have not accomplished anything of a concrete nature toward the maintenance and development of a stronger domestic mining industry generally. If anything, the climate has tended to be one that would discourage such action."

Despite that somewhat gloomy answer, I can assure you that WAYNE ASPINALL is not disheartened. He and his many colleagues in the Congress will continue to press for a policy and action on it.

I ask you, please, not to count me as an alarmist because I am critical of the executive departments. And I do not mean to discount the ability of any with whom we deal in those departments; they are highly com-